Landmines in Mozambique by Watch, Human Rights
James Madison University 
JMU Scholarly Commons 
Global CWD Repository Center for International Stabilization and Recovery 
2-1994 
Landmines in Mozambique 
Human Rights Watch 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons, Public 
Policy Commons, and the Social Policy Commons 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Global CWD Repository by an authorized 














 The Arms Project 
 











 Human Rights Watch  
 
 New York$Washington$Los Angeles$London 
Copyright 8 February 1994 by Human Rights Watch. 
All rights reserved. 
Printed in the United States of America. 
 
Library of Congress Card Catalog Number: 93 81027 
ISBN: 1-56432-121-5 
 
The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch 
The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch was formed in 1992 with a grant from the 
Rockefeller Foundation for the purposes of monitoring and seeking to prevent 
arms transfers to governments or organizations that either grossly violate 
internationally recognized human rights or grossly violate the laws of war.  It also 
seeks to promote freedom of information and expression about arms transfers 
worldwide.  The Arms Project takes a special interest in weapons that are 
prominent in human rights abuse and the abuse of non-combatants.  The director 
of the Arms Project is Kenneth Anderson and its Washington director is Stephen D. 
Goose.  Barbara Baker and Cesar Bolanos are New York staff associates, and 
Kathleen Bleakley is the Washington staff associate.  Monica Schurtman is of 
counsel. 
 
Members of the international advisory committee of the Arms Project are:  Morton 
Abramowitz, Nicole Ball, Frank Blackaby, Frederick C. Cuny, Ahmed H. Esa, Jo 
Husbands, Frederick J. Knecht, Andrew J. Pierre, Gustavo Gorriti, Di Hua, Edward J. 
Laurance, Vincent McGee, Aryeh Neier, Janne E. Nolan, David Rieff, Kumar 
Rupesinghe, John Ryle, Mohamed Sahnoun, Gary Sick and Tom Winship. 
 
Africa Watch 
Africa Watch is a nongovernmental organization established in 1988 to monitor 
and promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights in Africa.  
The chair is William Carmichael; the vice-chair is Alice Brown.  Abdullahi An-Na'im 
is executive director; Janet Fleischman is the Washington Representative; 
Bronwen Manby, Karen Sorenson and Alex Vines are research associates; 
Kimberly Mazyck and Urmi Shah are Associates. 
 
Copies of this report may be obtained by contacting Human Rights Watch 
Publications Department, 485 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY  10017 USA, Tel. (212) 972-
8400, FAX (212) 972-0905. 
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
 
Human Rights Watch conducts regular, systematic investigations of human rights abuses in some 
seventy countries around the world.  It addresses the human rights practices of governments of all 
political stripes, of all geopolitical alignments, and of all ethnic and religious persuasions.  In internal 
wars it documents violations by both governments and rebel groups.  Human Rights Watch defends 
freedom of thought and expression, due process and equal protection of the law; it documents and 
denounces murders, disappearances, torture, arbitrary imprisonment, exile, censorship and other 
abuses of internationally recognized human rights. 
 Human Rights Watch began in 1978 with the founding of Helsinki Watch. Today, it includes 
Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Helsinki Watch, Middle East Watch, and four collaborative 
projects, the Arms Project, Prison Project, Women's Rights' Project, and the Fund for Free Expression.  It 
now maintains offices in New York, Washington, Los Angeles, London, Moscow, Belgrade, Zagreb and 
Hong Kong.  Human Rights Watch is an independent, nongovernmental organization, supported by 
contributions from private individuals and foundations.  It accepts no government funds, directly or 
indirectly. 
 The executive committee includes Robert L. Bernstein, chair; Adrian W. DeWind, vice chair; 
Roland Algrant, Lisa Anderson, Peter D. Bell, Alice L. Brown, William Carmichael, Dorothy Cullman, Irene 
Diamond, Jonathan Fanton, Alan Finberg, Jack Greenberg, Alice H. Henkin, Stephen L. Kass, Marina Pinto 
Kaufman, Alexander MacGregor, Peter Osnos, Kathleen Peratis, Bruce Rabb, Orville Schell, Gary G. Sick, 
and Malcolm Smith. 
 The staff includes Kenneth Roth, executive director; Holly J. Burkhalter, Washington 
director; Gara LaMarche, associate director; Susan Osnos, press director; Ellen Lutz, California director; 
Jemera Rone, counsel; Stephanie Steele, operations director; Michal Longfelder, development director; 
Rachel Weintraub, special events director; Allyson Collins, research associate; Joanna Weschler, 
Prison Project director; Kenneth Anderson, Arms Project director; Dorothy Q. Thomas, Women's Rights 
Project director; and Gara LaMarche, the Fund for Free Expression director. 
 The executive directors of the divisions of Human Rights Watch are Abdullahi An-Na'im, 
Africa Watch; Juan E. Méndez, Americas Watch; Sidney Jones, Asia Watch; Jeri Laber, Helsinki Watch; 
and Andrew Whitley, Middle East Watch. 
 
Addresses for Human Rights Watch 
485 Fifth Avenue 
New York, NY  10017-6104 
Tel: (212) 972-8400 
Fax: (212) 972-0905 
email: hrwatchnyc@igc.apc.org 
 
10951 West Pico Blvd., #203 
Los Angeles, CA  90064 
Tel: (310) 475-3070 
1522 K Street, N.W., #910 
Washington, DC  20005 
Tel: (202) 371-6592 
Fax: (202) 371-0124 
email: hrwatchdc@igc.apc.org 
 
90 Borough High Street 
London, UK SE1 1LL 
Tel: (071) 378-8008 
Fax: (310) 475-5613 
email: hrwatchla@igc.apc.org 
Fax: (071) 378-8029 
email: hrwatchuk@gn.org 
 











 Colonial Rule....................................................................................................................4 
 Independence.................................................................................................................6 
 The War.................................................................................................................................7 
 Peace Negotiations....................................................................................................10 
 
THE MINES............................................................................................................................................12 
 Number and Location of Landmines ................................................................12 
 Mine Types and Sources.........................................................................................13 
 Landmine Use--Tactics and Strategies.........................................................26 
      Renamo Use of Landmines...............................................................................26 
  Government Use of Landmines .......................................................28 
  Use of IEDs and Booby-Traps ............................................................30 
  Other Users of Landmines .....................................................................? 
 Landmine Training......................................................................................................31 
  Renamo...........................................................................................................31 
  Government ................................................................................................32 
 Landmine Records.....................................................................................................35 
  
THE HUMAN COST ............................................................................................................................37 
 The Victims.....................................................................................................................38 
 Case Studies ..................................................................................................................41 
  Mine Locations...........................................................................................41 
   Mine Warnings ......................................................................................... 44 
  Poor Clearance .........................................................................................45 
 NGO and U.N. Mine Incidents ................................................................................46 
 Emergency Care for the Injured ........................................................................48 
 Hospital Treatment ...................................................................................................49 
 Rehabilitation................................................................................................................51 
  ICRC Activities ...........................................................................................52 
  Handicap International Activities .................................................53 
 
THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT ...................................................................................55 
 Repatriation...................................................................................................................56 
  The Mine Threat .........................................................................................57 
 Mine Awareness Initiatives .................................................................................62 
 Economic Implications...........................................................................................64 
 Social Plight of Victims...........................................................................................65 
 
MINE CLEARANCE INITIATIVES ..................................................................................................70 
 GSG Pilot Project ..........................................................................................................70 
 The U.N. Mine Clearance Plan...............................................................................73 
 Mine Clearance Delays............................................................................................75 
 Priority Road Clearance .......................................................................................... 77 
 NPA Clearance in Tete ..............................................................................................81 
 Recent Progress .........................................................................................................82 
  U.N. Mine Clearance Training Center...........................................82 
 Funding for Mine Clearance ................................................................................83 
  U.S. AID............................................................................................................84 
   U.S. DoD ..........................................................................................................86 
  Mine-Tech .....................................................................................................87 
  Mecam.............................................................................................................87 
 Independent Mine Clearance by the Government and ............................ Renamo
 NGO Mine Clearance Initiatives.........................................................................90 
  Halo Trust .....................................................................................................90 
  Mines Advisory Group ............................................................................91 
   
INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING LANDMINES ...............................................................92 
 International Disarmament Law .......................................................................92 
 International Humanitarian Law .......................................................................93 
  International Customary Law...........................................................94 




  Indiscriminate Attacks ........................................................................95 
  Military Utility Versus Humanitarian 
   Costs.............................................................................................96 
 The Landmines Protocol ........................................................................................98 
   
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.........................................................................101 
 Conclusions..................................................................................................................101 
 Recommendations..................................................................................................102 
  General ........................................................................................................102 
  To the Mozambican Government..................................................102 
  To Renamo .................................................................................................103 
  To the United Nations ..........................................................................103 





 Soviet PMN ............................................................................................................................ 
 Soviet PMD-6 ....................................................................................................................... 
 Soviet POMZ-2 ..................................................................................................................... 
 Chinese TYPE 72 ................................................................................................................. 
 Italian VALMARA 69.......................................................................................................... 
 U.S. M18A1 .............................................................................................................................. 
 PREFACE 
 
 Since 1986, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has been monitoring the human 
disaster created by landmines.  This is the latest in a series of HRW investigative 
reports on the landmine situation in various countries; previous reports looked at 
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Cambodia, Iraqi Kurdistan, and Angola.  In November 1993, 
Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights released Landmines: A 
Deadly Legacy, the first comprehensive examination of the worldwide landmine 
crisis.  This book describes the history and use of landmines, and their medical, 
social, and economic consequences.  It contains the first in-depth research into 
global production and trade in landmines, and provides a detailed examination of 
international laws governing the use of landmines.  It makes a persuasive case 
that the only solution to the landmine crisis is an international ban on the 
production, stockpiling, trade and use of landmines. 
 There are about one hundred million landmines scattered in more than 
60 nations around the globe.  Mines kill or maim thousands of people worldwide 
each year.  The majority of these victims are innocent civilians who step on a mine 
after armed conflict has ceased.  Once sown, landmines remain, hidden enemies, 
indiscriminate remnants of war that cannot distinguish between the boot of a 
soldier and the footfall of a child.  In many places, the land is blighted, making it 
nearly impossible for refugees to return home and for farmers to work their land, 
which impedes economic development.  The situation is already severe and 
threatens to become overwhelming if action is not taken immediately.   
 This disturbing report on the landmine situation in Mozambique 
comfirms the insidious nature of landmines and their devastating effect on 
individuals, communities and entire nations.  It gives us renewed vigor in calling 
for a comprehensive ban on landmines as the only way to address this human 
rights, humanitarian, and ecological disaster. 
 
 
 Kenneth Anderson   Stephen Goose 
 Director    Washington Director 
 The Arms Project       The Arms Project 
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 Mozambique was at war almost continuously from the 1960s, when the 
nationalist struggle erupted against the colonial Portuguese, until October 1992 
when the Mozambican government and Renamo rebels signed a ceasefire accord. 
 Throughout this period, combatants on all sides used landmines, often directly 
against civilians or in an indiscriminate fashion, in clear violation of the 1980 
Landmines Protocol. 
 Mines have already claimed more than 10,000 victims, and continue to do 
so even though the war has ended.  Mines and other types of light weapons and 
small arms are still plentiful and widely accessible.  The United Nations estimates 
that there are about two million mines in Mozambique.  Although Human Rights 
Watch's investigation leads it to believe that this figure is high, the devastation 
caused by landmines in Mozambique--not only to the many civilian victims, but 
also to the socioeconomic well-being of the nation--is undeniable and appalling.  
Clearance of mines will take many years, and probably decades.  So far, little has 
been done.  
 This report documents how this tragedy came about and its  
terrible, on-going consequences for the Mozambican people. It also documents 
the efforts being made to undo some of the damage. 
 Chapter two consists of a brief history of Mozambique and the wars that 
have ravaged the country for the last thirty years. 
 Chapter three examines the types of mines which have been used, and 
how they have been used. Mozambique does not itself manufacture mines; all the 
devices found in the country have been supplied from abroad by manufacturers, 
governments and arms dealers who are thereby accomplices in the maiming and 
death of thousands of Mozambican civilians.  Human Rights Watch has confirmed 
that 32 types of antipersonnel mines and 19 types of antitank mines, 
manufactured by 15 nations, have been used in Mozambique. But the number of 
mine types is probably greater. The total number of mines laid on Mozambican soil 
cannot be known, but it is certainly in the tens if not hundreds of thousands.  Some 
districts suffer badly while others do not have a serious problem. Few of the mined 
areas have been recorded or marked, and rarely have other measures been 
attempted to protect civilians. While there may have been a slender military 
rationale for some mine usage, the main impact has been to render paths and 
fields unusable to civilians except at great personal danger, thereby terrorizing 
the community. 
 




 Chapter four examines the human impact of the landmines. Although 
Mozambique's landmines injuries do not compare with the high numbers in 
Angola or Cambodia, the problem is still a serious one.  There are an estimated 
8,000 amputees in Mozambique who have received some form of medical 
treatment. The majority of the victims are civilians.  Landmines are likely to claim 
an increasing number of victims in the short-term, as millions of refugees and 
displaced people return to homes, fields, roads, and paths mined in their absence. 
 Small bush paths seem to be the worst mined areas.  Few civilian victims were 
warned about the danger of mines.   Emergency care for the injured is very basic 
and longer term medical facilities for them are inadequate.  Thousands of 
prostheses will be needed each year for the foreseeable future. 
 Chapter five looks at the wider social, economic and political impact of 
mines. Landmines constitute a serious hindrance to postwar development.  The 
pace and cost of economic reconstruction is directly affected by landmines.  
While posing dangers, landmines in Mozambique do not appear to be an 
overwhelming obstacle to repatriation.  Mines present the greatest threat to 
newly re-established rural communities moving into bush areas and to the local 
communities with little knowledge about the danger of landmines. Mine 
awareness initiatives will be important in an attempt to avoid further mine 
casualties.   
 Chapter six provides an account of current initiatives to clear landmines. 
Since January 1993 the United Nations has been responsible for overseeing a 
national mine clearance plan. But little formal mine clearance has gone ahead. 
The U.N. plan was not approved by the Mozambique government and Renamo until 
November 24, 1993.  Human Rights Watch believes that the U.N. plan is too focused 
on clearing main roads at the expense of some rural areas which are the source of 
the greatest number of civilian casualties. Only two mine clearance projects are 
underway: a pilot project to clear roads in central Mozambique begun in January 
1993, and clearance in the Tete province started in September 1993.  While U.N. 
initiatives continue to suffer delays, the government and Renamo have been 
engaged in their own mine clearance activities.   
 Chapter seven is an examination of international law governing 
landmines--primarily customary international law and the 1980 Landmines 
Protocol. Human Rights Watch believes that landmines are an indiscriminate 
weapon, and that therefore the use of landmines should be prohibited altogether 
under the requirements of customary international law.  It is evident that the great 
majority of landmines in Mozambique have been deployed in flagrant disregard of 
the provisions of the Landmines Protocol. In fact, the Landmines Protocol has 




proved wholly irrelevant to the conflict in Mozambique, as unworkable there as 
elsewhere in the world. Human Rights Watch concludes that only a complete 
global ban on the production, stockpiling, trade, and use of antipersonnel 
landmines can alleviate the human suffering caused by these weapons. 








 In October 1992 a ceasefire was signed, ending seventeen years of civil 
war between the Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique (Frelimo) government and 
the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (Renamo or MNR). The war claimed an 
estimated one million lives and displaced some five million people.  Its economic 
costs have been estimated at $15 billion; Mozambique's annual gross national 
product is less than $2 billion.  The war was characterized by widespread violence 
against civilians, including the systematic use of mutilations and killings and 
indiscriminate violence during sweeps through contested areas. Although the 
implementation of a United Nations-supervised peace accord is behind schedule, 
the peace appears to be on solid ground.  There are reasons to be optimistic that 
peace will prevail, but the challenge is immense.  
 Mozambique, a nation roughly twice the size of California, has a 
population of approximately 16 million, consisting of various ethnic groups 
including the Chewas, Makondes, Makuas, Ndaus,  
Rongas, and Shangaans. Mozambique is divided into 11 administrative provinces, 




 Although Mozambique was under varying degrees of Portuguese 
influence from the fifteenth century on, systematic Portuguese colonial rule took 
root only in the early twentieth century.  From 1890 until 1941 the economy was 
dominated by a patchwork of private chartered companies and other foreign 
concessionaries.  Little effort was made to develop Mozambique's economic 
infrastructure or the skills of its population, as the colonial regime was concerned 
with benefiting the white settlers and the Portuguese homeland.  The only period 
during which Mozambique was governed as a single administrative unit with a 
national economy was between 1941, when the last of the company charters 
lapsed, and 1974, when the Portuguese army rebelled in Lisbon.  Much of the very 
limited infrastructure inherited by Frelimo at independence in 1975 was created 
as late as the early 1970s as part of the Portuguese war effort. Even by the 
standards of colonial rule in Africa, Mozambique was a uniquely fragile creation.  
 
 Unlike most other colonial authorities in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
Portuguese stated that they would never decolonize. Mozambique became an 
overseas province of Portugal in 1951, with the right to send deputies to Lisbon, but 




the only people eligible were assimilados--a group of less than one per cent of 
Africans who passed tests to become full Portuguese citizens. Emblazoned in the 
black and white mosaic pavement outside Lourenco Marques' (renamed Maputo 
after independence) city hall was 'Aqui e Portugal' (Here is Portugal). 
 However, Portuguese colonialism crumbled very quickly in Mozambique. 
The first effective opposition to colonialism came in 1962 when Eduardo 
Mondlane, Frelimo's first president, succeeded in uniting various nationalist 
groups to form an umbrella party. In 1964, helped by radical African, Arab, East 
European, and Chinese aid, Frelimo launched a ten year war to end Portuguese 
colonialism.  
 Frelimo suffered from political infighting, which led to a series of deaths 
and disappearances. The assassination of Mondlane in February 1969 particularly 
weakened the movement. Following the assassination, Samora Machel became 
Frelimo's new leader and increasingly consolidated his control. 
 Although political infighting at first temporarily paralyzed the armed 
struggle, Frelimo's fortunes gradually improved on the battlefield. The guerrillas 
expanded their operations, crossing into the northwestern province of Tete in the 
late 1960s, just as the Portuguese launched their biggest offensive ever, Operation 
Gordian Knot, complete with napalm and scorched earth tactics, against Frelimo 
strongholds. Portuguese military commanders adopted harsh tactics against 
civilians, rounding up peasants and putting them in strategic hamlets, known as 
aldeamentos.  
 Frelimo's opening of the Tete front was a psychological blow to the 
Portuguese. A deal to build the giant Cahora Bassa hydroelectric project on the 
Zambezi river in Tete province was seen by many analysts as an attempt to draw 
South Africa into the war against Frelimo and to create a physical barrier between 
the white regimes of southern Africa and the rest of the continent. In December 
1972, Portuguese commandos massacred hundreds of peasants in Tete province 







 The war came to a close following a military coup in Lisbon in April 1974, 
brought about in part by growing disillusionment with Portugal's colonial wars.  
Portugal quickly decided to grant independence to its five African colonies, 




including Mozambique. The Frelimo leadership, bent on the total assumption of 
power itself, formed a transitional government in September 1974 with Joaquim 
Chissano (a member of Frelimo's central committee) as Prime Minister, and led 
the country to independence in June 1975, when Frelimo's leader Samora Machel 
became President. 
 With the departure of the Portuguese who had operated the economic 
and administrative infrastructure, untrained Frelimo cadres struggled to manage 
the country.  At the time of independence, over ninety percent of the population 
was illiterate and there were insufficient skilled people to run Mozambique. 
 Still, Frelimo was committed to a radical program of socialist 
transformation, and intended to reconstruct the entire social and material basis 
of Mozambican life. This involved exercising a greater degree of state control over 
the rural population than had been attempted before. Many policies originally 
introduced as an attempt at socialist transformation were later reproduced as 
counterinsurgency measures, when the government pursued even tighter control 
of the population for military reasons. 
 On the positive side, Frelimo began an ambitious education and health 
program in rural areas, which won much international acclaim. The number of 
primary school students doubled in just seven years. In the first decade of 
independence, the number of health posts quadrupled. 
 At the same time, the new government cracked down on the churches, 
especially the Roman Catholic ones which had largely supported the Portuguese 
during the war.  An estimated 10,000 Jehovah's Witnesses were rounded up and 
sent to a giant re-education camp. Suspected opposition supporters met the same 
fate. Frelimo also launched campaigns to undercut loyalties to the indigenous 
religions and forms of social organization. Traditional chiefs, many of whom 
exercised authority on the basis of spiritual ties to land, were a particular target. 
 In February 1977, Frelimo formally declared its transformation from a 
liberation movement into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party, with a mission "to 
lead, organize, orientate, and educate the masses, thus transforming the popular 
mass movement into a powerful instrument for the destruction of capitalism and 
the construction of socialism."   The decision came at a time when Mozambique 
was beginning to skirmish with Rhodesia, and was seeking to attract military aid 
from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.  "Mass democratic organizations" were 
set up to ensure Frelimo party control of workers, women, youth and journalists. 
State farms, mainly estates abandoned by the Portuguese, received massive 
investments, while peasant agriculture was largely ignored. 
 At the heart of Frelimo's plans to transform society was the communal 




village. Frelimo's villagization was mostly compulsory, sparking bitter resentment 
among the people who were supposed to inhabit these "aldeias comunais."  A 
severe lack of resources and trained personnel undermined the government's 
ability to provide basic services. The villages were often located and planned 
without asking local peasants for their views. 
 By 1981, 1.8 million Mozambicans had been moved into 1,266 communal 
villages. As the war spread, the army further promoted these villages for their 
counterinsurgency value, thus reminding many peasants of the aldeamentos, the 
protected villages from the Portuguese era. The villagization program and the 
parallel  marginalization of traditional chiefs and spirit mediums provided a 





 Mozambique imposed sanctions against the neighboring white minority 
Rhodesian regime in 1976. The closure of the border with Rhodesia disrupted the 
Mozambican economy and deprived its ports of lucrative earnings. It also marked 
the start of hostile relations. The Rhodesians began to look at ways of arming and 
training a Mozambican opposition force - Renamo.  
 Renamo was created in 1977 by the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Office 
(CIO) in retaliation for Mozambique's support for Zimbabwe nationalist guerrillas.  
Just before Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, the management of Renamo 
was turned over to South Africa's Military Intelligence Directorate (MID). 
 The transfer marked a turning point in the war, which soon began to 
escalate. The South African government used Renamo as a tool for destabilizing 
Mozambique and as a counter to Mozambique's support for the African National 
Congress (ANC).  Its aims were to disable Mozambique's infrastructure and 
economy, thereby bringing Frelimo to the negotiating table, and ultimately to 
overthrow Frelimo, replacing it with a more amenable government. Pumped up 
with ample military supplies from South Africa, Renamo's strength increased 
between 1980 and 1982 from less than 1,000 to 8,000 fighters.  The first combat 
areas were Manica and Sofala provinces, but Renamo quickly expanded its 
military operations throughout most of the country.  By 1982 fighting had spread to 
Gaza and Inhambane provinces and to the country's richest province, Zambezia. 
 In the early 1980s, Renamo acquired its reputation for savagery. It 
became particularly well-known for its practice of mutilating civilian victims, 
including children, by cutting off ears, noses, lips and sexual organs. Renamo also 




engaged in numerous attacks on civilian targets such as transportation links, 
health clinics and schools. 
 Frelimo made a bid to end the war in 1984, when it signed the Nkomati 
non-aggression pact with South Africa. South Africa said it would halt its support 
of Renamo if Maputo stopped its support for ANC military operations. A series of 
South African-mediated negotiations followed between Frelimo and Renamo, with 
some positive results. However, further rounds of talks quickly collapsed. 
 Frelimo largely stuck to the Nkomati Accord, while, by their own 
admission, the South Africans did not. Foreign Minister "Pik" Botha conceded that 
"technical violations" of Nkomati had occurred, after Mozambique publicized the 
contents of rebel diaries found by Zimbabwean and Mozambican troops when they 
overran Renamo's Casa Banana headquarters (near Gorongosa, Sofala province) 
in 1985. 
 The Nkomati accord brought no let-up in the war. Massacres by Renamo 
continued. Renamo launched its biggest offensive ever along the length of the 
Zambezi valley in the provinces of Zambezia, Sofala, Manica and Tete. Indeed the 
Nkomati Accord did not damage Renamo militarily, it merely forced it to change its 
strategy. During the six months before the agreement was signed, the South 
African military airlifted a huge quantity of arms to Renamo bases inside 
Mozambique, and advised the rebels to change their insurgency strategy. Rather 
than relying on rear bases in South Africa, Renamo would now have to provision 
itself from the local population and replenish its arms supplies from captured 
weaponry. Renamo also moved away from attacking military targets (which 
required large amounts of arms and ammunition) in favor of attacking "soft" 
civilian targets. Renamo also began to exercise greater control over populated 
areas and to engage in looting and pillaging on a wider scale. 
 Although the government scored a major military success in August 
1985, with the capture of Renamo's headquarters at Casa Banana and related 
bases, it found it difficult to maintain the momentum of this success. The 
government was faced with the classic dilemma of a conventional army facing a 
guerrilla force which avoided direct military confrontation but which was able to 
move through most of the countryside freely. 
 By 1986, Renamo units had pushed deep into Zambezia province and had 
routed poorly supplied government positions in Tete, especially in Mutarara 
district. At one point it looked as if Renamo would capture the city of Quelimane 
(Zambezia), cutting the country into two and giving Renamo the opportunity to set 
up an alternative government. These Renamo gains and the fears of even more 
severe famine caused tens of thousands of refugees to flee to Malawi. 




 As the Mozambique Armed Forces (FAM) weakened, the government took 
steps to reverse the situation. Diplomatic pressure was put on Malawi to halt 
Renamo operations on its soil. More Tanzanian and Zimbabwean troops were 
brought in to help the government forces to regain lost territory from Renamo.  
 During this period, President Machel was killed in a mysterious plane 
crash. Joaquim Chissano, Mozambique's foreign minister since independence, 
became President. Chissano undertook the major review of Frelimo's economic, 
foreign and human rights policies which Machel had been considering. This 
ultimately led to the reforms and peace negotiations which began in 1990. 
 The FAM launched a major counter-offensive along the Zambezi river in 
1987. Soviet-trained Red Beret commandos, with air support, toppled one rebel-
held town after another on the north bank of the Zambezi river. An estimated 3,000 
Tanzanian soldiers took up defensive positions along the river valley, guarding the 
recaptured settlements. Elite Zimbabwean paratroopers launched an offensive in 
Manica and Sofala, and pounded rebel strongholds in the mountainous Gorongosa 
region. The tide had clearly turned and Renamo was increasingly on the 
defensive. 
 
 This FAM counter-offensive and the continuing actions of Renamo sent 
hundreds of thousands of refugees into the neighbouring countries of Malawi, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The biggest massacres of the war occurred in late 1987 in 
Inhambane and Gaza provinces, all by Renamo.
1
  Renamo appears to have 
committed the atrocities in a desperate attempt to stop military reverses in the 
area.  
 In April 1988, the U.S. State Department released a report on Renamo's 
treatment of civilians, as told by refugees.
2
 In this report, Robert Gersony, a 
specialist in refugee affairs, accused the rebels of killing at least 100,000 people 
and of running what were effectively slave labor camps in zones they controlled. 
He reported that only a fraction of the armed attacks against civilians in 
Mozambique could be attributed to the government army.  While the report 
accurately detailed the horror of much of Renamo's military methods and human 
rights abuses, it minimized abuses by the FAM.  
                                                                    
    1 See "Conspicuous Destruction: War, Famine & The Reform Process in Mozambique," 
Africa Watch, New York and London, 1992. 
    2 Robert Gersony, "Mozambique Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict Related 
Experiences in Mozambique," U.S. Department of State, Washington D.C., 1988. 







 By late 1988, it had became clear that there could be no military solution 
to the war. President Chissano met South African President Botha at Songo in Tete 
province in September 1988 and secured a pledge that Pretoria would abide by 
the 1984 Nkomati Accord. Unlike the previous South African pledge, this one 
appears to have been largely honored. Chissano also gave senior church leaders 
of the Roman Catholic, Anglican and Protestant congregations permission to open 
direct contacts with Renamo leaders. A breakthrough came in February 1989 in a 
meeting in Nairobi (Kenya) between church members and Renamo. The message 
the bishops brought back to Maputo was that Renamo too was tired of war and that 
peace negotiations were possible.  
 Indirect contacts through the clerics then began with Renamo in Nairobi, 
with Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi and Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe 
appointed as co-mediators. In August 1989, multiple-point statements of principle 
by both sides were exchanged.  After several failed initiatives and false starts, 
direct Renamo-Frelimo peace talks eventually began in Rome (Italy) in July 1990, 
mediated by the Sant' Egidio Catholic lay community. 
 After five rounds of talks, a partial ceasefire was reached in December 
1990. In return for Zimbabwean troop withdrawal into the Beira and Limpopo 
transport corridors, Renamo agreed not to attack these strategic trade routes. A 
Joint Verification Commission (JVC) with representatives from eight countries was 
set up to oversee this. But by January the ceasefire was seriously weakened, with 
Renamo alleging Zimbabwean violations in 54 locations and Renamo attacking 
the Limpopo corridor. 
 Widespread famine conditions injected a new urgency into the peace 
process in 1991 and 1992, as the war prevented the provision of adequate 
emergency relief to the needy population. As drought spread, Renamo's ability to 
live off the land steadily collapsed and it became increasingly desperate in its 
search for food. Renamo's attacks on Mozambique's main urban and semi-urban 
areas increased. In January 1992, there were seventy-one attacks on Maputo 
alone, largely to obtain supplies. 
 Paradoxically, climatic disaster provided a window of opportunity in the 
peace process. With Renamo increasingly hungry and finding its traditional 
external supply sources drying up, peace looked increasingly attractive.  
 During 1991 and 1992 negotiations between Frelimo and Renamo 
occured intermittantly while fighting continued across Mozambique. Renamo was 




again on the offensive in the south, nightly attacking the suburbs of Maputo. After 
twelve often torturous rounds of negotiations, a ceasefire was eventually signed 
in Rome on October 4, 1992 between President Joaquim Chissano and Renamo 
leader Afonso Dhlakama. 
 Under the terms of the General Peace Accord (GPA), demobilized Renamo 
forces and government troops are to form a 30,000-strong army. Subsequently it 
was agreed that a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) force of up 
to 7,500 personnel will oversee the transition period. Multiparty elections are to 
follow once demobilization is complete and voters have registered. Elections will 
be held in late 1994 at the earliest. One of the U.N.'s tasks is to coordinate the 





 THE MINES 
 
 This chapter examines the types of landmines used in Mozambique, their 
origin, and the methods used by the parties to the conflict to disseminate them. 
While minelaying occurred from 1964 until 1992, most mines were laid by Frelimo 
and Renamo between 1978 and 1990. Few detailed or reliable records exist on the 
types or numbers of mines used by the warring armies, or on where and how the 
mines were used. The information in this chapter has been obtained primarily 
from Human Rights Watch's own investigations, but includes material gathered in 
a piecemeal fashion by those responsible for mine clearance activities. 
 
Number and Location of Landmines 
 
 In the absence of a comprehensive survey, no one knows the true extent 
of the landmine infestation in Mozambique. The most commonly cited figure is the 
December 1992 United Nations estimate of 2 million mines. However, this figure 
has no scientific basis; it was reached by simply taking the average of estimates 
being circulated at the time (which tended to range from one to four million).  
Nevertheless, the U.N. estimate has played a very useful function in focusing 
international donor attention on Mozambique's disturbing landmine situation. 
 Human Rights Watch was unable to conduct a comprehensive 
assessment of the number of landmines, but its systematic survey--the first of its 
kind in Mozambique--indicates that the U.N. total is an overestimate.  The U.N.'s top 
mines expert, Patrick Blagden, has admitted to Human Rights Watch, "It is likely 
that our initial figures were over-pessimistic.  However, Mozambique has a 
serious mines problem and we are concerned to improve this situation."
1
  
 The total number of landmines in Mozambique is certainly in the tens of 
thousands, and probably in the hundreds of thousands.  While some districts in 
Mozambique suffer badly from mines, others do not.  Based on Human Rights 
Watch's own survey and interviews, and statistics provided by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (see Chapter 5), it appears that the most heavily 
mined regions are the Zimbabwean border areas and the provinces of Sofala, 
Maputo, Manica, and Inhambane.  The central areas of Manica and Sofala 
provinces are particularly bad.  The provinces of Zambezia, Gaza, Tete, and 
Nampula also have a significant mine problem.  Niassa and Cabo Delgado appear 
                                                                    
    
1
 Telephone interview, New York, July 26, 1993. 








  It should be noted, however, that some of the lesser affected 
provinces have pockets which are as badly mined as the more affected provinces. 
 It may be that the most heavily mined district is Mitarare in Tete province. 
                                                                    
    
2
 An Oxfam report on mines in the Niassa province concluded, "Mines do not present a 
hazardous threat to NGO operations in Cuamba (the main town in southern Niassa).  They 
are not responsible for the closure of any major arteries, nor are they presenting any 
significant degree of casualties... There is some evidence of mining in the district, but no 
evidence of a widespread problem."  Nevertheless, a local Army mining officer provided 
Oxfam with a list of 34 locations mined by Frelimo with about 500 mines.  While many of the 
mines may have been cleared or detonated already, it will be necessary to inspect each 
location.  Oxfam, "Recce Notes - Niassa Province," undated (1993). 
 
Mine Types and Sources 
 
 The great majority of mines in Mozambique appear to be of former Soviet 
or East European origin.  These mines were used by both government troops and 
Renamo.  The antipersonnel mines found in the largest quantity in clearance 
operations and inspections of arsenals are former Soviet PMN, POMZ-2 and POMZ-
2M mines.  Other types are present in smaller, but still significant, quantities.  
 Renamo's mines were initially supplied by the Rhodesians and later the 
South Africans.  Most were of former Soviet and East European origin. The 
Rhodesians obtained some of their mines from South Africa, and captured others 
during anti-guerrilla operations in Zambia and Mozambique.  South Africa 
produces its own mines, and also captured many Soviet- and East European-made 
mines during its post-1975 military operations inside Angola in support of the 
rebels of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola).  
 However, by the late 1980s Renamo had become almost completely 




reliant on the arms, including landmines, that it captured from the Mozambican 
government forces.  Renamo propaganda often boasted of captured government 
arms. For example, Renamo Presidential Communique No. 11/495/90 reported in 
1990 that in Namapa (Nampula), "Our forces captured 8 tons of mortar bombs, 359 
antipersonnel mines and one military transmitter."  When the government showed 
off newly captured Renamo bases and weaponry in the late 1980s, a significant 
proportion of the war booty on display appears to have been originally captured 
by Renamo from the government.  
 Still, up to the October 1992 peace agreement, the Mozambican 
government claimed that it had evidence that the South African government, or 
individuals in South Africa, continued to supply Renamo with weapons. One such 
example was reported in the then state-controlled daily newspaper Noticias on 
February 21, 1989. The paper carried an interview with captured Renamo 
combatant Moises Macaxaze. Macaxaze claimed that while he was with Renamo 
he saw a South African plane drop supplies of antitank mines, antipersonnel 
mines and other ammunition in the Chibuto district of Gaza province on November 
12, 1988. 
 Human Rights Watch has been unable to obtain any firm evidence to 
substantiate Mozambican government and international press allegations that 
Kenya supplied arms, including mines, to Renamo in the late 1980s.
3
 
 Human Rights Watch has confirmed that the following 32 types of 
antipersonnel mines, and 19 types of antitank mines, have been deployed in 
Mozambique. This information is based on physical inspection of the mines 
themselves or detailed descriptions or photographs of them.
4
 It is likely that some 
additional types have been used, but Human Rights Watch has not been able to 
obtain reliable evidence on other mines.
5
 
                                                                    
    
3
 See, for example, The Independent, August 28, 1990. 
    
4
 Much of the technical information that follows about the mines identified by Human 
Rights Watch is drawn from Jane's Military Vehicles and Logistics: 1993-94 (Surrey: Jane's 
Information Group Limited, 1993). 
    
5
 The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch has compiled the most comprehensive data 
base on antipersonnel landmine types and manufacturers worldwide.  It lists over 340 
antipersonnel mines, manufactured by at least fifty nations.  A summary of the data base is 
reproduced in Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, The Arms Project and Physicians for Human 
Rights, November 1993. 







 Former Soviet Union 
 
1.  PMN  
  Source: U.S.S.R. (ex) 
  Manufacturer: Soviet State Arsenals 
  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure 
 
The PMN, a very common mine, may be responsible for more mine-related deaths 
and amputations throughout the world than any other mine. Although easily 
detected, this mine device has a large explosive content (240 grams of TNT) and 
requires as little as 0.25kg of direct pressure to initiate an explosion.  Injuries 
from this mine can often be fatal.  
       
2.  PMN-2  
  Source: U.S.S.R. (ex) 
  Manufacturer: Soviet State Arsenals 
  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure 
 
The PMN-2 differs from the PMN most notably in that the delay arming mechanism 
is irreversible and there is no known neutralization technique. 
      
3.  PMD-6M  
  Source: U.S.S.R. (ex) 
  Manufacturer: Soviet State Arsenals 
  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure 
 
This mine employs a wooden box body with a block of cast TNT initiated when 1-
10kg of downward pressure on the box forces the pin out of a MUV-2 fuze. The 
design has been widely copied. After having been buried for some time, this mine 
becomes unstable and finally ineffective once the wood rots. There is a high 
metallic content in the fuze, aiding detection. 
   




4. & 5. POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M  
  Source: U.S.S.R. (ex) 
  Manufacturer: Soviet State Arsenals 
  Type: Antipersonnel fragmentation 
  Initiation: Tripwire 
 
Both types consist of a cast iron fragmentation casing mounted on a wooden 
stake. The casing contains a 75 gram charge of TNT and a fuze (normally an MUV 
fuze) which protrudes from the top of the casing. A tripwire is connected to a 
striker-retaining pin in  the fuze. A pull of approximately 1kg on the tripwire will 
release the striker and initiate an explosion. The POMZ-2 has six rows of 
fragmentation; the POMZ-2M has only five. Both mines have an effective killing 
range of up to 25 meters. 
 
6.  OZM-3 
  Source: U.S.S.R. (ex) 
  Manufacturer: Soviet State Arsenals 
  Type: Antipersonnel bounding fragmentation  
  Initiation: Remote, pressure, pull, or tension-release 
 
This mine can be initiated by electrical or other remote control, or, depending on 
fuzing, by pressure, pull, or tension release.  Following initiation, the mine base 
explodes, expelling the main charge to a height of 1.5 to 2.4 meters before it 
explodes. Height is determined by a tether wire.  The charge throws metal, from an 
inner fragmentation shell, with an effective radius of 25 meters. 
 
7.  OZM-4 
  Source: U.S.S.R. (ex) 
  Manufacturer: Soviet State Arsenals 
  Type: Antipersonnel bounding fragmentation 
  Initiation: Pull or pressure 
 
  Derivitive of OZM-3 (above), but cannot be fired  
 electrically. 
   
8.  OZM-72 
  Source: U.S.S.R. (ex) 
  Manufacturer: Soviet State Arsenals 




  Type: Antipersonnel bounding fragmentation 
  Initiation: Pull, pressure, or remote 
   
This mine is fired by either electrical remote control or a pull or pressure fuze. As 
the mine is fired a propellant charge blows it upwards until a tethering wire is 
drawn taut which detonates the fuze at about 1 meter above the surface. The main 
charge explodes, sending the steel shrapnel in all directions.  It has a lethal 
radius of 25-30 meters. When an electric detonator is used the mine will explode 
immediately. In this role the mine will normally therefore be placed above ground. 
 
   
9. & 10. MON-50; MON-100  
  Source: U.S.S.R. (ex) 
  Manufacturer: Soviet State Arsenals 
  Type: Antipersonnel directional fragmentation. 
  Initiation: Remote or tripwire   
 
The MON-50 is a virtually identical Soviet derivative of the U.S.  Claymore (see 28 
below), with a lethal range of 50 meters. The MON-100 is a larger version of the 
MON-50. The cylindrical casing has a face diameter of 220mm and contains 450 
pieces of steel fragmentation mounted in 5kg of plastic explosive. The killing area 
is reported to be 100 meters. 
        
 Belgium 
 
11.  NR 409 (M409) 
  Source: Belgium 
  Manufacturer: Poudres Reunie de Belgue (PRB SA) 
  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure 
 
This is a small mine, approximately 80mm in diameter and 40mm high. It contains 
approximately 75 grams of RDX/TNT. It comes with the detonator sealed in position 
and is totally waterproof. Operating pressure is approximately 10 kg. It has very 








12.  Type 69 
  Source: People's Republic of China 
  Manufacturer: China North Industries, Beijing 
  Type: Antipersonnel bounding fragmentation 
  Initiation: Pressure or tripwire 
 
This mine can be set to explode by pressure or tripwire. On detonation it bounds to 
1.5 meters before exploding, discharging approximately 250 metal fragments over 
a lethal radius of more than ten meters. 
 
13. & 14. Type 72 and 72B 
  Source: People's Republic of China 
  Manufacturer: China North Industries, Beijing 
  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure or anti-disturbance 
 
This small, nearly all-plastic antipersonnel mine is one of the most frequently 
encountered mines in the world. Because of its low metal content, it is very 
difficult to detect.  The 34-gram explosive charge is small, but is sufficient to 
produce severe injuries.  The Type 72 and 72B are externally identical, but whereas 
the Type 72 operates only by pressure, the Type 72B also has an anti-disturbance 
mechanism, so that the mine will explode when it is handled or disturbed in any 
way, making it extremely unstable.   
 
 Former Czechoslovakia 
 
15.  PP-Mi-Sr 
  Source: Czechoslavakia 
  Manufacturer: Czechoslovak State Factories 
  Type: Antipersonnel bounding fragmentation 
  Initiation: Pull or pressure 
 
Initial activation of this metallic-cased bounding mine may be by pull-fuze using a 
tripwire or by pressure-fuze. These fuzes set off the propellant  
 
 
charge which, after a three second delay, causes the mine to leap upwards to a 
tethered height of one meter before detonation. The casing of the mine acts as 








16.  M 59 (Mi AP DV 59) 
  Source: France 
  Manufacturer: Societe d'Armement et d'Etudes Alsetex. 
  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure 
     
The case is made of plastic with the undetectable Al-PR-ID-59 pressure fuze 
inserted in the top of the mine. It can cause traumatic amputation of foot or lower 
limb. 
 
 Former East Germany 
 
17.  PPM-2 
  Source: Germany (former GDR) 
  Manufacturer: Former East German state factories 
  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure, electric charge 
 
The integral fuze is delay-armed, pressure initiated and electrically fired and 
utilizes a central spring-loaded "snap column" to transmit pressure on the 




18.  Valmara 69 
  Source: Italy 
  Manufacturer: Valsella Meccanotecnica SpA, Brescia 
  Type: Antipersonnel bounding fragmentation 
  Initiation: Pressure or tripwire 
 
This bounding mine is filled with either 650 6mm steel ballbearings or 1,200 4mm 
steel cubes which act as shrapnel. It can be initiated by either 10kg of direct 
pressure on the fuze prongs or 6kg exerted on a tripwire. Upon initiation, the mine 
is fired to approximately 1.2 meters vertically on a tether wire before exploding; it 




has a killing zone of 27 meters throughout and an arc of 360 degrees. Exploding at 
the height of a person's chest, it has the power to rip out the heart of anyone 
standing within one hundred feet. 
 
19.  VAR-40 
  Source: Italy 
  Manufacturer: Valsella Meccanotecnica SpA, Bresica 
  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure 
 
This mine is compact enough to be carried in a pocket or knapsack. It is buried 
with a buttonhead jutting out. Twelve kilograms of pressure produces an 
explosion powerful enough to damage light vehicles. 
 
20.  VAR-100 
  Source: Italy 
  Manufacturer: Valsella Meccanotecnica SpA, Bresica 
  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure 
 
This plastic-cased mine, like the VAR-40, can be carried in a pocket or knapsack, 
but has a larger blast. It can severely damage light vehicles. A 12 to 13 kg force on 




21.  M969 (also known as MAPS)  
  Source: Portugal 
  Manufacturer: Explosivos da Trafaria 
  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure 
 
The Portuguese M969 is basically a copy of the Belgian NR409. It is sometimes 
called Mina Anti-pessoal de Plastico (MAPS) because it is almost entirely non-
metallic. The mine body color is normally olive green but may be sand-coloured 
dependent on customer requirements. The mine comes with a safety cap which is 
removed when the mine is laid. 
 




 Former Rhodesia 
 
22.  'Ploughshare' 
  Source: former Rhodesia 
  Manufacturer: Various companies (because of sanctions) 
  Type: Antipersonnel directional fragmentation 
  Initiation: Tripwire 
 
A dish shaped directional fragmentation mine designed to be operated by 
tripwire. The fuzing mechanism is a standard U.K. pattern No. 4 pull switch (a 
booby-trap switch) which is located in the middle of the dish. The Ploughshare 
differs from other directional fragmentation mines such as the Claymore (U.S. 
M18A1) in that the fragmentation portion (consisting of about 350 pieces of 6mm 
chopped steel bar) is on the concave rather than convex surface, thus keeping the 
fragments in a fairly concentrated pattern rather than spreading them in an 
increasing arc. This is likely to increase the lethal range and hit probability. The 
stand provided with the mine is designed to allow the mine to swivel once the 
tripwire is tensioned so that it will always point along the line of the wire and thus 
directly at the object or person hitting the wire.  The mine is approximately 
250mm in diameter.  The explosive filling is 150 grams of Pentolite (PETN/TNT). 
   
 South Africa 
 
23.  M2A2 
  Source: South Africa 
  Manufacturer: Denel Ltd (Successor to Armscor) 
  Type: Antipersonnel 
  Initiation: Pressure 
 
This small, pressure-operated blast antipersonnel mine was known as the R2M2 
before 1984. The mine body is made of plastic. The overall body color is brown. It 
requires approximately 10 kg of pressure to cause it to function and contains 
approximately 50 grams of RDX/TNT. Its dimensions are approximately 60mm in 
diameter and 50mm in height. The metallic content is minimal. This mine was 
used during the 1968- 
 
 
1980 Rhodesian conflict and used in Mozambican operations. It was sometimes 




placed on top of a 1 lb (commercial) Pentolite explosive booster to increase its 
lethality. 
 
24.  No.69 
  Source: South Africa 
  Manufacturer: Denel Ltd. (Successor to Armscor) 
  Type: Antipersonnel bounding fragmentation 
  Initiation: Pressure or tripwire 
 
This bounding mine is a copy of the Valmara 69 (see 18 above) but is 
distinguishable by its brown body color. (The South Africans use a standard color 
for vehicles, equipment and mines, which is known as Nutria brown - middle 
brown). 
 
25.  South African Claymore (Shrapnel Mine No. 2) 
  Source: South Africa 
  Manufacturer: Denel Ltd. (Successor to Armscor) 
  Type: Antipersonnel directional, fixed fragmentation 
  Initiation: Remote or tripwire 
 
This is a copy of the U.S.-manufactured M18A1 Claymore (see 28 below), and is 
sometimes called Shrapnel Mine No. 2.  It is also identifiable by its brown body 
color. 
 
26.  South African Mini-Claymore 
  Source: South Africa 
  Manufacturer: Denel Ltd. (Successor to Armscor) 
  Type: Antipersonnel directional, fixed fragmentation 
  Initiation: Remote or tripwire 
 
This smaller version of the Claymore is designed to be used either singly or 
stacked in twos or threes. 
 
 United Kingdom 
 
27.  No.6 (nicknamed 'Carrot' mine by Rhodesians) 
  Source: United Kingdom 
  Manufacturer: Royal Ordnance, Chorley; Forpearch Ltd. 




  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure or tripwire 
 
At independence, the Rhodesians inherited stocks of this mine from the Southern 
Rhodesian colonial authorities. The spring-loaded striker is retained by a plastic 
shear ring. A load acting upon the pressure prongs breaks the ring releasing the 
striker. The striker fires the built-in detonator which fires the charge. This mine 
ceased to be manufactured in the 1980s. 
 
 United States 
  
28.  M18A1 Claymore 
  Source: U.S.A (copies produced in many countries) 
  Manufacturer: Thiokol Inc. Shreveport, Louisiana and  
 others 
  Type: Antipersonnel directional, fixed fragmentation 
  Initiation: Remote or tripwire 
 
This directional fragmentation mine is manufactured at the Thiokol/U.S. Army 
facility in Louisiana and elsewhere in the United States.  When exploded, usually 
by a pull wire or remote electric firing device, 700 steel ball bearings are 
projected in a 60-degree arc for more than 50 meters to a height of six feet. 
 
29.  M-14 
  Source: U.S.A (also produced in India) 
  Manufacturer: U.S.A 
  India - Ordnance Factory Board, Calcutta 
  Type: Antipersonnel, non-metallic, blast 
  Initiation: Pressure 
 
An extremely compact plastic pressure mine, measuring only 56mm in diameter 




30.  PROM 1 
  Source: Yugoslavia (ex) 
  Manufacturer: Federal Directorate of Supply &  





   Type: Antipersonnel bounding fragmentation 
  Initiation: Pressure 
 
Pressure pushes the cylinder down, freeing the retaining balls which allows the 
striker to hit the percussion cap. This ignites the delay element which burns for 
approximately 1.5 seconds and then ignites the bounding charge, which in turn 
ejects the mine 0.7 to 1.5 meters above the surface of the ground (as limited by a 
tether wire). The main charge then explodes, causing fragmentation which is 




31 & 32. RAP-1; RAP-2 
  Source: Zimbabwe 
  Manufacturer: Zimbabwe Defence Industries, Harare 
  Type: Antipersonnel blast 
  Initiation: Pressure 
 
These mines were originally produced in small numbers during the Rhodesian 
period, but were not then used in Mozambique. They appear to be modifications of 
Portuguese M969s. Production continued after independence. A small batch 




 Human Rights Watch recorded 19 types of antitank mines in 
Mozambique, manufactured by ten different countries.  Antitank mines are 
generally designed to incapacitate tanks and other heavy vehicles, usually by 
causing damage to the tracks, final drive or idlers, although some are designed to 
pierce the armor and kill the crew by secondary fragmentation. The government 
used very few tanks in its war effort against Renamo. Antitank mines were 
deployed by Renamo against heavy military or civilian vehicles. 
 The pressure required to initiate an antitank device varies from 60-
500kg depending on the make and design. Humans, animals and light vehicles 
usually pass over them safely. Although they present a lesser risk to civilians than 
antipersonnel mines, the incidents of cars and trucks (especially when heavily 
loaded) and their passengers being blown up by antitank mines are still common 




enough to be of serious concern. As well as being set off by normal direct 
pressure, they may be exploded by lesser pressure when there is a fault in the 
mine, or when an antipersonnel mine is laid on top of the antitank mine, or when 
another means of initiation is used.  Some antitank mines can also be 
intentionally altered to explode by less pressure. 
 Antitank mines usually kill many more people at the time of impact. For 
example, a truck carrying more than 40 people on the road to the village of 
Nhangau from Beira struck a antitank mine on April 15, 1991, killing nine civilians 
and injuring a further 20. 
 Human Rights Watch recorded the following types of antitank mines in 
Mozambique.  The country of manufacture is in parentheses. 
 
 1. TM-46 (ex-U.S.S.R.) 
 2. TM-57 (ex-U.S.S.R.) 
 3. TMN-46 (ex-U.S.S.R.) 
 4. TM-62D (ex-U.S.S.R.) 
 5. TM-62M (ex-U.S.S.R.) 
 6. TM-62P (ex-U.S.S.R.) 
 7. TMK-2 (ex-U.S.S.R.) 
 8. Mk5 (U.K.) 
 9. Mk7 (U.K.) 
10. M19 (U.S.A) 
11. M24 (U.S.A) 
12. Type 72 (China) 
13. Pt Mi Ba III (ex-Czechoslovakia) 
14. T-AB 1 (Brazil) 
15. AC NM AE T1 (Brazil) 
16. DNW ATM 2000E [PZM] (Austria) 
17. PRB M3 (Belgium) 
18. No.8 MK1 (South Africa) 
19. 'Chocolate Cake' (ex-Rhodesia) 
  
 The latter mine is a plastic-cased antitank blast mine containing 6 kg of 
Pentolite (PETN/TNT).  It is normally painted brown or green. The operating 
pressure required to activate the mine is in excess of 100 kg. The mine is activated 
when the top cover is crushed by a weight of 100 kg plus and pressure is applied 
to any of the three antipersonnel mines (normally U.S. or Indian M14s) set in the 
cast Pentolite charge.  The mine also incorporates a No 6 Pressure Release Switch 




(U.K. pattern booby trap switch). After 1980 small numbers of this mine were 
manufactured in South Africa.  
  
Landmine Use--Tactics and Strategies 
 
 Landmines were deployed by the parties to the conflict in Mozambique in 
a variety of ways, frequently in violation of the Landmines Protocol.  Frelimo and 
Renamo regularly disseminated landmines in a random and indiscriminate 
fashion, although both denied to Human Rights Watch that they used mines in this 
manner.  This was sometimes used as a tactic to deter infantry attack and 
reconnaissance patrols, but civilians were often the main victims of randomly-
laid mines.  Neither side made records of randomly disseminated mines. Random 
laying of mines is irresponsible and without regard for the welfare of the civilian 
population. 
 In many instances, particularly in central Mozambique, it appears that 
the government and Renamo intentionally targeted civilians in their battle to 
control areas.  It appears that both sides used mines deliberately to terrorize 
civilian communities and to deny them access to fields, water sources, and 
fishing points.  This prevented the peasants from producing food.  In the southern 
provinces, Human Rights Watch found that Renamo was largely responsible for 
laying mines specifically to discourage or make impossible the return of 
displaced persons (deslocados) to their homes.  In Inhambane and Gaza 
provinces water wells, clinics, schools, small factories, cashew-nut groves and 
cattle-dip tanks were mined. Some cemeteries and the access paths to them have 
also been mined, causing acute distress to the relatives of the dead who 
traditionally consult the spirits of the deceased for guidance. 
 
 Renamo Use of Landmines 
 
 Renamo's war against the government was aimed at the devastation of 
the economy and the isolation of government forces to garrisons and towns.  As 
part of this campaign, Renamo used landmines extensively.  In addition to random 
dissemination and deliberate targeting of the civilian population, route denial and 
ambush mining were frequently employed tactics.  Renamo was assisted in its 
landmine operations by Rhodesian forces in the late 1970s, and by South African 
forces in the early 1980s.  After 1985, however, Renamo increasingly chose its own 
targets and laid its own mines. Renamo military officials told Human Rights Watch 
that many Renamo units experienced landmine shortages during the late 1980s, 




partly due to over-extended supply routes. Although Renamo's stockpiles of mines 
in its main bases were plentiful, transporting them in any quantity over long 
distances to outlying units became an increasing problem, especially once the 
covert South African airdrops of munitions significantly declined from 1985 
onwards.   
 
 Route Denial 
 
 Renamo planted mines on major supply roads and rural tracks, primarily 
using antitank devices, in an attempt to deny such routes to opposing forces. In 
some cases, especially along the Zimbabwe border, the antitank mines were 
surrounded by antipersonnel mines in order to hinder clearance attempts.   
 Airstrips were also an important target for Renamo mining. In order to 
make air resupply of beseiged government positions difficult, Renamo frequently 
dispatched groups to lay mines on government airstrips in outlying districts.  
Government forces used vehicles, or occasionally herds of animals, to sweep 
airstrips of potential mines before planes were allowed to land.  
 During 1991 and 1992, there were several incidents where International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) flights were affected by mined airstrips in 
Renamo zones.  However, it is unclear who planted these mines.  The government 
was reluctant at the time to see humanitarian aid flown to Renamo areas. Renamo 
also alleges that Zimbabwean troops mined ICRC-used airstrips in Sofala 
province. (See below). 
 On occasions when Renamo experienced a shortage of mines (which 
Renamo military officials told Human Rights Watch happened frequently in the 
late 1980s), or when mines were difficult to lay, Renamo would block roads by 
other means, such as deep trenching or the placing of felled trees and large rocks. 




 Renamo frequently used mines on roads and tracks to set up ambushes.  
Both antitank and antipersonnel devices were employed, depending on the target, 
i.e., whether it was a vehicle convoy, an armored column or a foot patrol.  Renamo 
officials indicated to Human Rights Watch that since antitank and vehicle mines 
were scarce, they would deactivate unused mines, lift them, and deploy them 
elsewhere if the ambush failed. The process was described as "fishing."  Specially 
trained soldiers were used to lift these devices; they were given better food 




rations and other rewards in return.   
 In some cases tracks were trenched or blocked to channel pedestrians 
and vehicles into mined areas.  Antipersonnel mines were also used to attack 
people trying to escape or take cover at ambush sites.   
 One minelaying technique used by both Renamo and the government 
were "patrol traps."  These were interlinking mines normally set so that the point 
man passed several devices before triggering a mine, thus ensuring that the 
remaining members of the patrol were within the killing zone of the mine pattern 
when the initial detonation occured. 
 
 Government Use of Landmines 
 
 The government's use of landmines was primarily defensive in nature, 
although like Renamo, it also engaged in random dissemination, deliberate 
targeting of the civilian population, route denial and ambush. 
 
 Defensive Mining 
 
 The government and its allied forces used defensive mining to protect 
key economic installations and strategic locations from insurgent sabotage and 
capture. The government used antipersonnel mines to protect the bases of 
electricity pylons and bridges from sabotage. Some stretches and verges of roads 
and railways, dams, factories and water pipelines were also protected in this 
manner. In addition, the government laid protective and nuisance minefields 
around the perimeters of towns and municipal centers where Renamo attacks 
were expected. Many government hospitals and clinics were also defended by 
landmines in an attempt to stop Renamo from raiding them for medicines. Large 
minefields also surround the quartels and entrenched defensive positions of 
government units, especially in Zambezia.  Renamo sometimes used herds of 
animals to breach defensive minefields. They used this tactic during an attack on 
the Piquenos Limbombos Dam project (Maputo) in 1989. 
 In the early 1980s the government laid large defensive minefields along 
the South African border in anticipation of a possible South African invasion.  Parts 
of the Malawian border were also mined. Large numbers of both antipersonnel 
and antitank mines were used. Many of these defensive minefields appear to have 
been recorded.  The minefields around some military installations are clearly 
marked. 
 Government patrols also laid mines around their positions when they 




stopped at night.  Many of these mines were left behind when the patrols moved 
on, posing a lethal danger to civilians.   
 Most of the government's mines were laid in the mid-1980s. By 1990 
declining air transport capacity meant that few shipments of mines were sent to 
outlying districts from the provincial capitals. 
  
 Other Government Uses 
 
 In late 1991, in Tacuane (Zambezia), an ICRC relief plane had its wheels 
blown off while landing.  The airstrip had been under Renamo control when the 
plane took off, but by the time it landed, the government had taken control and had 
mined the airstrip, fearing it might not hold the area if Renamo launched a 
counter-offensive.  It is possible that the government mined other airfields as well, 
particularly in Zambezia and Manica and Sofala, as the government was reluctant 
at the time to see food aid and medical supplies flown to Renamo areas.  However, 
this can not be firmly established.  It is known that when operating in Renamo 
zones government units laid antitank mines on well-maintained stretches of road 
which they suspected might be used as airstrips by Renamo.  
 Government forces also used landmines in ambushes against Renamo.  
They primarily employed antipersonnel mines to ambush foot patrols.  Since 
Renamo lacked vehicles and generally operated off roads, the government only 





 Use of IEDs and Booby-Traps for Mines 
 
 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and booby-traps for mines were 
used by both Renamo and government forces.  Both the Rhodesians and the South 
Africans trained Renamo combatants in booby-trapping mines, using tripwire 
devices linked to other mines, plastic explosives, grenades, and other ordnance.  
In January 1993, south of Nambui village (Morrumbala district, Zambezia province), 
government forces uncovered two TM-46 antitank mines, laid without fuzes and 
packed with RPG-7 projectiles to increase the blast. The device had been planted 
by Renamo as part of a failed ambush attempt.  Former Rhodesian and South 
African Special Forces operatives who worked with Renamo up to the mid-1980s 
admitted to Human Rights Watch that they improvised booby-traps from plastic 




explosives, and that such devices were placed along the Cahora Bassa powerline.  
 A Renamo mines expert interviewed by Human Rights Watch in June 1993 
nevertheless claimed that his men very rarely bothered with booby-trapping, 
saying it was "too much work, especially as we might need those devices again."  
Interviews with government soldiers and mine victims support this. It appears 
that the only time Renamo consistently used booby-traps was when it wanted to 
deter rehabilitation of economic and communications installations, such as 
power and telephone lines. Mines used for sabotage were not always placed in 
the ground. For example, a Renamo booby-trapped landmine exploded on August, 
31, 1989 on the roof of the Mobeira flour and biscuit factory (Beira), killing one 
worker. 
 Government soldiers were also trained in booby-trapping and IED 
techniques. Some mines in defensive minefields were booby-trapped because 
Renamo units captured mines to re-use them against the government. This 
became increasingly common in the early 1990s. 
 Anti-lift or anti-disturbance devices, which explode when an attempt is 
made to clear a mine, were used in Mozambique but were not widespread.  Human 
Rights Watch obtained evidence that a small quantity of South African 
manufactured No8 MK 1 antitank mines were delivered to Renamo; these may have 








 Rhodesian military officials began training Renamo combatants in 
landmine use in 1977, giving them  basic training in how and where to plant mines, 
and how to activate and booby-trap them. By 1979 there were frequent landmine 
incidents along Mozambique's borders. Barbara Cole's 1986 pictorial book about 
Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS) operations includes a photograph of a 
Rhodesian SAS unit teaching Renamo how to plant mines. Cole notes, "The 
Rhodesians trained and guided the infant Resistance (Renamo), teaching them 




                                                                    
    
6
 Barbara Cole, The Elite: Rhodesian Special Air Service Pictorial (Transkei: Three Knights, 




 When South Africa took over management of Renamo in 1980, it 
continued training in mine warfare. A 1981 Renamo training manual obtained by 
Human Rights Watch explains how and where to plant mines. It particularly 
focuses on the craft of ambush and how to channel vehicles into the mined sides 
of the road. The document also emphasized the importance of using captured 
weaponry.  
 Renamo soldiers interviewed by Human Rights Watch in June 1993 
confirmed the existence of mine specialists trained specifically in laying and 
lifting mines.  A German aid worker, Robert Rosskamp, who was held by Renamo at 
its Tete provincial base for a month in 1986, noticed a hierarchy amongst Renamo 
where each person showed his rank by wearing a particular colored cloth; special 
leaders at his camp, who wore yellow neckchiefs, led units of mine layers, 
grenade throwers, or radio operators.
7
  As indicated by Rosskamp's account, 
minelaying was a specialist activity, which was also rewarded by privileges. 
Several Renamo members indicated to Human Rights Watch that often these 
specialists were reluctant to pass on their expertise as this could potentially 




 Frelimo began planting mines in 1977 when Rhodesian incursions started 
to pose a security threat. Many of the technicians had received training in mine 
laying in Tanzania, China and Algeria when they were still operating as nationalist 
guerrillas against Portuguese colonial rule.  As a Frelimo military official told 
Human Rights Watch in December 1992, "I was trained in Algeria in 1968 in mine 
laying techniques. I have since used them against the Portuguese, Rhodesians 
and Renamo. Over the years I must have planted over thirty types of mines in 
Mozambican soil." 
 
 The government's chief mines expert for Manica and Sofala provinces, 
Captain Bonaventura Gavalho, told Human Rights Watch that in the 1980s soldiers 
were selected for training in mine warfare in the Soviet Union and that a training 
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school was also opened up in Nampula in the early 1980s. Captain Gavalho 
received additional mine training in 1987 when he attended the British Military 
Assistance Training Team (BMATT) course at Nyanga, Zimbabwe. He claims that 
the government's best mine laying/mine clearing specialists obtained their 
training there. Government troops use British and former Soviet mine detectors to 
assist them in their clearance. 
 
Other Landmine Users 
 
 In addition to Renamo and government forces, troops from Portugal, 




 Mines still remain from the 1964-1974 nationalist struggle against 
Portuguese colonial rule.  Although Portuguese minefields continue to exist, few 
records appear to have survived from this period.  Portuguese-laid minefields are 
evident in Nampula province along the Lurio river which formed a barrier between 
Portuguese colonial forces and Frelimo forces, and in Cabo Delgado along the 
Rovuma river. The Portuguese also defensively mined their military camps, 
especially in the Mueda and Nangade districts of Cabo Delgado province.  Once 
these facilities were abandoned, the mines were left behind, effectively leaving an 
unknown number of mine circles in the bush. A similar hazard is left from shifting 




 Rhodesian Special Air Service (SAS), Selous Scouts and Rhodesian Light 
Infantry (RLI) units deployed mines with Renamo between 1977 and 1980. These 
units often preferred to use South African-manufactured Claymores during their 
special operations in Mozambique. Supplies of these and other ammunition were 
air-dropped inside Mozambique for these units.  Claymores were used in an SAS 
attack against Chioco garrison (Tete province) on 24 March 1977. The SAS set up a 
bank of ten Claymores against the walls of two corrugated iron barrack rooms and 
wired them up to a switch so that they would explode simultaneously. In 
September-October 1979, the SAS planted Claymores on their flanks and to their 








 South Africa 
 
 Between 1980 and 1985 South African special forces also directly 
assisted Renamo in mining economic and infrastructure targets.  Both South 
African-manufactured mines and captured Soviet/East European mines were used 




 A force of some 5-7,000 Tanzanian soldiers assisted the Mozambican 
government in the fight against Renamo.  Human Rights Watch has discovered 
that Tanzanian troops laid defensive minefields around their bases in Zambezia 
province. The north bank of the Zambezi river around the village of Chimura 
(Mopeia district), 25 km northeast of Mocubela, has antipersonnel mines laid by 
the Tanzanian army. Morrumbala probably also has landmines laid by the 
Tanzanians. No maps of these minefields were left behind when the Tanzanian 




 During the war Renamo claimed that the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) 
was responsible for laying mines against their forces. For example Renamo's 
Presidential Communique No/010/495/90 (dated September 1990), states, 
"Zimbabwean troops have laid antipersonnel landmines along the banks of the 
Zambezi river to kill anyone trying to cross it. To date, 275 people have been killed 
and 491 wounded. The wounded civilians are receiving treatment in Renamo 
hospitals." 
 Attempts by Human Rights Watch to ascertain whether Zimbabwean 
forces laid (presumably defensive) minefields in Mozambican territory have been 
inconclusive. Colonel Lionel Von Dyck of the Zimbabwe-based mine clearance 
company Mine-Tech has been active for many years in military operations inside 
Mozambique, starting as a Rhodesian trainer of Renamo. After independence he 
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used his experience in command of an elite ZNA parachute regiment in operations 
against Renamo. He denied categorically to Human Rights Watch that his ZNA men 




 Renamo also alleges that Zimbabwean troops mined ICRC-used airstrips 
in Sofala province.  An April 1, 1991 Renamo Communique from the Office of the 
President and signed by Renamo spokesman, Joaquim Vaz, states: 
 
  (J)oint Frelimo-Zimbabwean forces attacked a centre 
of the International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC, in Senga-
Senga last Saturday, 30th March 1991. Besides setting ablaze 
clothes and medicines meant for the people in the area, a 
Zimbabwean military unit specialised in sabotage, laid 
landmines along the runway of the Canxixe Airstrip. 
  It is everybody's knowledge that the ICRC planes land 
at the Canxixe Airstrip bringing relief supplies for the people in 
the Senga-Senga area. But the Zimbabwean forces chose to lay 
more than 70 antipersonnel and antigroup landmines which 
were supplemented by an explosive network inside the Airstrip 
besides creating mines zones around the same Airstrip. 
  Faced by the sabotage, the President of Renamo, 
Afonso Dhlakama, has ordered the closure of the Airstrip. 
However, a group of Renamo's military engineers will soon 
embark on the task of removing the mines which are inside and 
outside the Airstrip. Therefore, all the flights by the ICRC planes 
to the Airstrip are closed until all the mines have been removed. 
 
 Human Rights Watch has been unable to confirm this particular incident 
although it has established that there was a government offensive against 
Renamo in this area at the time and that the ICRC was forced to temporarily 
suspend its operations in this area because of the fighting.   
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 Landmine records are scanty. The government and the U.N. claim that 
there are none.  Despite these public denials, Human Rights Watch gained access 
to the government's national mines map. Classified as "Top Secret," the map 
reveals the locations of the government's strategic minefields nationwide. There 
are no surprises on the map, with the main minefields located in the south to 
protect the capital Maputo from any potential South African invasion, along parts 
of the Malawian border and around various military and economic installations. 
The map does not account for mines randomly disseminated in the countryside. 
 The government also denies that it has any records of the types and 
numbers of mines it imported. However, Human Rights Watch learned from 
government military officials that the Ministry of Defence has records of imported 
shipments. These are regarded as highly confidential. Although unable to gain 
access to these files, Human Rights Watch was told that the majority of shipments 
came from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. One shipment of Brazilian 
antitank mines was also made. During the construction of the Pequenos 
Limbombos dam in Maputo province the Italian construction firm supplied Italian 
landmines to protect it. This could explain the findings of Valmara-69s in the 
Limpopo valley although some of these could also be South African imitations. 
 The South African Special Forces and Rhodesian units recorded the 
location of at least some of the mines they laid in case they posed a threat to 
future covert operations. Some of the companies contending for clearance 
contracts employ individuals with this knowledge, using it as part of their 
credentials for bidding for clearance contracts.  
 Renamo has few written records of the mines its forces laid or the types 
it used. Knowledge remains with local commanders and combatants. When a 
World Food Program (WFP) truck hit a landmine in June 1993 on a road which 
Renamo had declared safe and cleared, Renamo eventually apologized saying 
that the individual responsible for planting the mine died three years ago, so the 
location had been forgotten. Where Renamo has long occupied an area, it appears 
to have better knowledge of the exact mine locations. An Oxfam worker travelling 
in a Renamo area in Zambezia in January 1993 describes an example of this in his 
field report: "In a certain point the (Renamo) guy at my back said: 'Be careful, 
there is a mine somewhere nearby. Don't leave the main way.' I was terrified. 
Nothing happened but the U.N. and MSF people were not informed and had already 
overcame the mined place. Brrriii!!!..." 
 A U.N. official told Human Rights Watch that, while the U.N. would 
welcome maps, they would be of limited help and could not be relied on 
operationally since their comprehensiveness and accuracy would be 









 THE HUMAN COST 
 
 The human costs of the landmine problem in Mozambique have been 
high.   The number of landmine casualties in Mozambique is not as great as in the 
world's most afflicted nations (such as Afghanistan with hundreds of thousands of 
mine injuries, Cambodia with more than 30,000, or Angola with approximately 
20,000), but the problem is very serious for an impoverished population 
struggling to emerge from decades of uninterrupted war.  
 Landmines have claimed more than 10,000 victims in Mozambique.  
Although neither the government nor Renamo has kept detailed records of the 
numbers of people killed or injured by landmines, there are an estimated 8,000 
amputees who have received medical treatment.  Thousands more have been 
killed, or did not require amputation, or did not seek medical treatment.  A recent 
report by a mine clearance organization stated that health care officials in 
Mozambique have suggested that half of all mine casualties die before reaching a 
hospital, and another five percent either die in the hospital or were not recorded.1  
The same study estimated that over 500 people have been killed or maimed by 
landmines since the war ended in October 1992.2 
 The total number of landmine casualties in Mozambique therefore is 
probably between 10,000 and 15,000.  With a population of about 16 million, that 
would represent roughly one landmine victim in every 1,000 to 1,600 people. 
 Greatly compounding the terrible toll taken by landmines is the fact that 
Mozambique's capabilities and facilities for evacuation, emergency treatment, 
hospital treatment, and rehabilitation of landmine victims are inadequate and not 
improving.  Landmines, when they do not kill, inflict ravaging wounds, usually 
resulting in traumatic or surgical amputation.  Those who survive the initial blast 
require antibiotics, large amounts of blood, and extended hospital stays. After 
discharge from the hospital, mine amputees require physical therapy and 
prosthetic devices to lead normal and productive lives.  Some are horribly 
disfigured and may need therapy to cope with their trauma.  Many mine victims in 
Mozambique, as in so many landmine-infested nations in the developing world, 
will never receive these services. 
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 This chapter first recounts some of the circumstances in which 
Mozambicans fell victim to landmines. It then goes on to discuss the medical care 
and rehabilitation which is provided, and some of the problems affecting 




landmine victims in their attempts to live a semblance of a normal life.   
 The material for this chapter is derived from several sources. 
Information on twenty-seven landmine victims was obtained from interviews 
carried out by Human Rights Watch in June and July 1993.  This sample size is 
small, but the cross-section of the victims represented gives an indication of the 
type of Mozambicans who have suffered, and continue to suffer, from landmine 
injuries. Information was also provided by the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), Handicap International (HI), and other sources. The ICRC permitted 
Human Rights Watch access to its prosthesis clinic files in Maputo and Beira. 





 The only reliable available records on landmine injuries are those of the 
ICRC and Handicap International prosthesis workshops. Even their figures are 
only rough estimates. Until 1990 the government refused to let the ICRC indicate in 
its records what type of device caused the injury of an individual needing 
prosthesis treatment. They were only allowed to write "war." They also could not 
record whether the victim was a soldier or civilian. This policy was changed in 
1990, and subsequent forms have become more detailed.  Since 1993, even the 
exact location of the accident has been recorded. 
 One also has to be careful in comparing ICRC and HI data.  Soldiers 
appear to prefer to go to ICRC clinics for treatment and consciously avoid visiting 
HI if possible, perhaps believing the quality of treatment is better at the ICRC 




(though there is no evidence of a disparity in quality between the ICRC and HI 
workshops). HI also consciously encourages civilians rather than soldiers to 
attend its clinics. The victim statistics must be assessed in this light.  
 The ICRC files on victims receiving treatment at the Beira clinic reveal 
the following: 
 
   Category     1990-92    1993 (January-June) 
 
   Male  223  21 




   Female  51 8 
    
   Civilians  151  13 
   Military  123  11 
    
   Children  14   5 
    
   Road  64  9 
   Track  60  6 
   Fields  49  3 
   Bush/paths 108  11 
    
   Sofala  165  19 
   Manica  64  6 
   Tete   10  1 
   Zambezia  10  1 
   Inhambane  10  2 
   Maputo  13 0 
   Gaza   8  0 
   Cabo Delgado  1  0 
 
 
 These figures indicate 54% of the landmine victims were civilians, and 
80% were male.  Children constituted six percent of the victims.  Bush paths were 
a far more prevalent location for mine accidents than roads, tracks, or fields. 
 Human Rights Watch also conducted a random sample of 160 ICRC files 
from its national data base in Maputo. These files revealed  a similar ratio of 
civilian to military victims, and male to female victims. The bush paths were once 
again the scene of the greatest number of incidents.  
 
 However, the ICRC figures contrast markedly with statistics from 
Handicap International's Inhambane clinic, where 97% of mine casualties were 
civilians, and only 40% were male. 
 Of the 27 mine victims interviewed by Human Rights Watch, twenty (or 
74%) were civilians, and twenty (or 74%) were male.  However, the number of 
military victims is small at least in part because soldiers were locked in a 
compensation dispute with the government and were reluctant to speak to us. 
Government officials also showed little enthusiasm for Human Rights Watch's 




attempts to interview military mine victims. No Renamo military mine victims 
were interviewed by Human Rights Watch.   
 Taking the ICRC, Handicap International, and Human Rights Watch 
information together, it seems clear that a significant majority of landmine 
victims in Mozambique in recent years have been civilians.  Men have suffered 
more casualties than women, and children have also been victims. 
 The majority of the soldiers recorded in the ICRC files were under thirty 
years of age.  Overall, a disproportionate number of the disabled are young men, a 
fact which reflects conscription policy. Three government child soldiers (aged 
between 14-16) were also listed in these files.  The age span of civilian victims is 
much wider.   
 While male landmine victims outnumbered female landmine victims, it 
appears that more women die from landmine injuries than men.
3
  Women also 
tend to be more badly injured than men.  The damage done by a blast mine is 
related in part to the weight of the person affected; larger people tend to suffer 
less severe injuries. Women in rural areas are often lighter than men and so 
suffer worse injuries.  Human Rights Watch also found that communities 
transferred male mine victims to hospitals quicker than females and supported 
them more fully for follow up treatment.  
 Children (aged under sixteen) are also affected. Beira's ICRC files record 
nineteen children. Human Rights Watch interviewed two children. In one incident 
a child stepped on a mine going home from school and lost her left leg. A 14-year-
old boy lost his right leg in March 1993 when gathering firewood for his parents. 
Old people, being less mobile, are less prone to landmine injuries. ICRC files in 
Beira revealed only ten.  However, three of the 27 victims interviewed by Human 
Rights Watch were over 50 years of age. 
 The great majority of the mine victims interviewed were injured by 
antipersonnel mines. In Human Rights Watch's interviews there were only three 
antitank/antivehicle victims.  However, antitank/antivehicle mines typically 
caused many more deaths at a time; in March 1993 one antivehicle mine incident 
near Inhaminga destroyed a tractor and trailer, killing 27 and injuring five, some of 
them seriously. 
 The majority of victims interviewed in the southern provinces blamed 
Renamo for planting mines. In central Mozambique, 40% of the victims blamed the 
                                                                    
    
3
 In Angola, Human Rights Watch observed both a similar sex casualty ratio and sex 
fatality ratio. See, Landmines in Angola, (New York: Africa Watch, 1993). 




government, 10% blamed Zimbabwean units, and 30% blamed Renamo. The other 
20% did not know. However, it is also likely that some of those who said they did 
not know who planted the mines, especially in central Mozambique, had their own 
suspicions but preferred not to identify them. All the victims in Renamo areas 
blamed the government or Zimbabwean troops, although in several cases 
involving antivehicle mines, further enquiries by Human Rights Watch indicate 
that these were planted by Renamo. The Renamo combatants responsible for 





 Mine Locations 
 
 The ICRC data identified four basic locations for mine incidents, 
indicating that bush paths were the most common at 37% of the total, then roads 
(23%), tracks (21%), and fields (16%).   
 The Human Rights Watch 1993 survey identified the locations of mines 
and circumstances of landmine incidents in more detail.  From a total of 27 injury 
cases, four occurred in fields.   
 
Case 1.  A.G. is a forty-six-year old peasant farmer and father of five from 
Gorongosa district (Sofala province).  A.G. stepped on a mine in July 1987. It had 
been planted in his machamba (cultivated field), which was in an area normally 
patrolled by Zimbabwean troops. He had not been aware of the presence of 
landmines in the area. He was then evacuated to the hospital in Gorongosa  
where his left leg was amputated below the knee.  After one week, he was 
transferred to Beira's hospital for three months of treatment. A.G. moved in 1990 to 
Gondola and has a machamba there now. 
 
 Even after the signing of the peace agreement, landmines continue to 
pose a threat to farmers.  
 
Case 2.  G.Z. is a twenty-year-old peasant farmer and tradesman from Zavala 
(Inhambane).  In October 1992, G.Z. went into his field to cut grass. While cutting 
the grass his sickle hit a landmine 
which exploded. He was helped by friends who evacuated him by tractor to the 
rural hospital in Zavala. After one week there, he was transferred to the hospital in 




Chicuque, where he underwent surgery and remained in the hospital for a month. 
He has lost both hands and one eye and is undergoing eye surgery in Chicuque.  
 
 The vast majority of people interviewed by Human Rights Watch were 
injured by mines placed on small bush paths. People were walking to their fields, 
to wash, to go to church or to the cemetery. Often those injured were walking at the 
head of a line of people in single file, frequently along a path that they had passed 
safely before.   
 
Case 3. O.D. is a twenty-five-year old farmer.  He stepped on a landmine in 1987, 
while walking along a frequently used path returning to his home village from 
school in Vunduzi (Sofala). He was evacuated to the hospital in Gorongosa for first 
aid and amputation. After two days of internment in the local hospital, he was 
transferred to Beira's provincial hospital. His right leg was amputated below the 
knee. 
 
Case 4. A.J. is between forty and forty-five-years-old. She was born in Dombe 
(Manica). In 1981 she stepped on a mine on a path to her machamba. She was then 
evacuated by military convoy to Chimoio, where she stayed in the hospital for four 
months.  Her whole left leg was amputated.  She was not aware of the existence of 
landmines in her area but remembers government soldiers and Renamo being 




Case 5. C.J. is a peasant farmer from Nhangoma, Mutarara (Tete). In 1989 she was 
walking on a path to her machamba with her husband when she stepped on a 
mine. Her husband died instantly but she survived and was evacuated to Chimoio 
in a military convoy for hospital treatment. After six months in hospital she was 
discharged and has decided to stay in Chimoio where she now has a small 
machamba. 
 
 Mines placed on paths continue to claim victims: 
 
Case 6. S.A. is thirteen-years-old, and in the fourth class of primary education. In 
October 1992 he went with three other school-children friends to the nearby bush 
to cut grass for the roof  of his parents' house. On the way back he stepped on a 
landmine on a path commonly used by local villagers. He was evacuated from 




Machaze (Manica) by air two days later to a hospital in Beira where he underwent 
surgery. His left leg was amputated below the knee. S.A. has been in the hospital 
ever since. 
 
Case 7. A.C. is a 47-year-old peasant farmer from Munguine, Manhica (Maputo). In 
December 1992 he stepped on a  mine on a seldom used path to the cemetery 
where his parents are buried. He had been on the way to clean their graves. This 
was the second time he had used the path since the war ended. Local peasants 
managed to get A.C. into a car which evacuated him to the rural hospital in 
Manhica for first aid. He was then transferred to the central hospital in Maputo. 
After one month at the hospital he returned to Manhica. 
 
 Many mines have been planted on riverbanks, especially around bridges. 
As bridges and their approaches are a well-known location for mines, civilians 
tend to be very careful when nearing them. The only mines detected and 
destroyed by Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) clearing the Inhaminga-Caia (Sofala) 
road in June-July 1993 were at a destroyed bridge. Both were antipersonnel mines, 
probably laid by Renamo to deter rebuilding. 
 
Case 8. S.A. is 37-years-old. He is a former telephone operator at the Acucareira 
de Mocambique, in Mafambisse (Sofala). In April 1992 he was walking home from 
work when he stepped on a mine under the N.8 bridge over the Pungue river. He 
suspects government soldiers planted it. A company truck took him to a hospital 
in Beira. After three months treatment he returned home. 
 
Case 9. M.A. is a 53-year-old demobilized soldier. In April 1990 he stepped on a 
mine along a river bank of the Thoa river in a neighborhood called Primeiro de 
Maio (First of May) near Chimoio (Manica). He had been going to fish with some 
friends. He was evacuated to Chimoio's Provincial Hospital where amputation was 
performed. M.A. has had a long and difficult recovery due to post-surgery 
complications. 
 
 Mine Warnings  
 
 The majority of victims were on well-used paths and were unaware of the 
immediate danger of mines.  Most victims believed that the mines had only been 
recently laid at the time of their accident, based on discussions with other 
villagers and other information, such as whose forces were in the area.  Since the 




October 1992 peace accord, many villagers have started to travel on less 
frequently used paths, thus increasing their exposure to mines.  These victims 
have no idea when the mine which caused their injury was laid. 
 
Case 10.  T.C. is between 35 and 40 years old. She stepped on an antipersonnel 
mine in the late 1980s, during the war, while returning homes to Cancinza village 
from her machamba near Lake Nhancorossa, on a path normally used by the local 
population. She was carried by other peasants to the rural hospital in Gorongosa 
town (Sofala), where she was treated for three months. She was then evacuated on 
a military convoy to Beira (some 190 km southeast) for further treatment. Later T.C. 
found out that the path had been mined by government soldiers operating in the 
region, in the belief that the path was being used by Renamo guerrillas to infiltrate 
the area. The soldiers did not warn local villagers, fearing that some of them could 
be Renamo sympathizers and pass on the information to the rebels. She knows of 
nine other people from her village who also suffered similar accidents with 
landmines. 
 
Case 11.  V.M. was a local government militiaman from Boquisso (10-15 km north of 
Maputo). While patrolling his village with a colleague at night in 1989 he stepped 
on a landmine. His colleague lost one foot; he lost both legs up to the thighs. He 
suspects that the landmine was planted by Renamo agents in his village. Both 
victims were helped by government soldiers, who provided transport to evacuate 
them to hospital in Maputo. He has spent two years in hospital. 
 
 
 While most minefields are not marked, local people are aware of the 
location of most minefields and they are able to inform newcomers of the paths to 
use or to avoid. There are some attempts to fence off minefields or put up warning 
signs. Several of the government's attempts to do so have failed because the 
impoverished local population has taken down the wire and signs to use them for 
their own domestic purposes or for selling in the informal market (Dumba 
Nengues or Tchunga Moyos).  
 Commercial estates such as Lonrho's citrus estate at Umbeluzi (Maputo) 
are also surrounded by a defensive mine field. There has been no attempt to put 
up warning signs or fence-off the area. Local officials justify the lack of signs by 
arguing that, although the war is over, these minefields are needed to stop fruit 
thieves. 
 




 Poor clearance 
  
 Poor quality mine clearance is also a problem. 
 
Case 12.  S.T. is a 23-year-old from Machaze (Manica). In May 1993 he stepped on a 
mine along a path in an area that government soldiers had previously declared 
safe. In April 1993 government officials had informed the village that they had 
neutralized all landmines in the area and S.T. had seen some military personnel 
digging out and exploding mines at the time. He was evacuated by air to Beira and 
had been at the hospital for five weeks at the time of our interview. 
 
 Human Rights Watch was told of another incident that highlights the 
danger of mines in areas presumed safe. A middle-aged man was driving a car 
with Swaziland license plates to Maputo.  He stopped to urinate near Impaputo, 
about 20 kilometers from the border town of Naamacha.  He walked two meters off 
the tarmac and stepped on a landmine.  He was badly injured.  His four women 
passengers could not drive and flagged down a car to take him to the nearest 
hospital in Naamacha.  Witnesses claimed that there had been other similar 
incidents along the road. 
 UNICEF has related a tragic story about the danger in areas thought to be 
clear of mines: 
 
  "On 11 November 1993, a nun and a team of workers 
were transporting seeds provided by UNICEF.  Their truck hit a 
landmine on the road from Barue to Macossa in Manica 
province, a route believed to be free of mines.  The nun escaped 
with minor injuries, but five of the workers were killed instantly 





NGO and U.N. Mine Incidents 
 
 International attention on the need for mine clearance in Mozambique 
has increased since February 5, 1993 when a humanitarian agency convoy hit an 
antitank mine on the road between Regone and Namarroi (Zambezia). A local 
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Renamo official and Oxfam (UK) worker were killed. A Medecins Sans Frontieres 
(MSF) physician was slightly injured. An Oxfam press release dated February 7, 
1993 tells the tale: 
 
  A convoy of 3 vehicles was travelling on the main road 
north from Mocuba to Regone, which is near the border of Gurue 
District. In the first vehicles were people from the Christian 
Council of Mozambique (CCM). The second vehicle belonged to 
the ICRC.  The Oxfam Land Cruiser was the third vehicle in the 
convoy. They were going to make contact with people in a 
Renamo controlled zone. 
  
  The vehicles were following all the established 
security guidelines. The trip was a scheduled one, approved by 
UNOHAC (the U.N. Office for Humanitarian Coordination) two 
weeks ago. This means that it was approved by the U.N., by the 
Government and by Renamo.The ICRC vehicle was flying the 
ICRC flag. The CCM had travelled safely along the road at least 
four times. It was a branch road used because the main road 
has yet to be declared safe. The accident occured in a "no-
man's land" between government and Renamo-held areas. 
 
 
  The first two vehicles passed the mine without 
incident, but the Oxfam Land Cruiser's rear left wheel detonated 
the mine. It had been raining very heavily recently, and this 
could have caused the mine to come to the surface. There were 
five people travelling in the Oxfam vehicle...The three who 
survived probably owed their lives to the fact they were wearing 
seat belts. 
 
  The Oxfam Land Cruiser was carrying 200 litres of fuel, 
which miraculously didn't explode. The accident happened 
about 10 km from the nearest village. People from both the 
Government and the Renamo side heard the blast of the 
explosion and came to see how the survivors were at [1:00 p.m.]. 
They offered to return with food, but didn't do so. The three 
suvivors decided not to try to travel by road and, together with 




two ICRC delegates, spent Friday night near the scene of the 
accident. They were rescued at [7:30 a.m.] on Saturday by an 
ICRC helicopter, which had flown up on Friday from Beira to 
Quelimane, and then on to Mocuba, where it collected the two 
bodies and transported them back to Quelimane hospital... 
 
 Oxfam and MSF then temporarily suspended relief distribution 
operations in the province until they received new guarantees that the roads they 
used were cleared of mines.  In this incident Renamo had guaranteed that the 
road was mine clear. In the same month rainfall exposed an antitank and an 
antipersonnel mine on a Zambezian road which had been considered safe for 
international humanitarian vehicles. Renamo claimed that the government had 
mined the road to reduce agency activity into Renamo zones.  
 Between October 1992 and July 1993 seven incidents involving either the 
ICRC, the WFP or ONUMOZ occurred. In February 1993, the tenth truck in a WFP food 
convoy hit two antipersonnel mines on the Dondo to Inhaminga road (Sofala); 
nobody was injured on that occasion. 
 In March 1993, after a WFP convoy had hit two antipersonnel mines, the 
WFP, frustrated at the slow rate of mine clearance, used a bulldozer to push mines 
to the side of the Dondo to Inhaminga road. During the operation the bulldozer and 
a grader were damaged by three more antipersonnel mines. Although there have 
been no incidents since, the road will have to be professionally cleared because, 
once the rains start, mines pushed to the side are likely to drift back into the road, 
posing a renewed threat to traffic. 
 ONUMOZ has suffered only one mine accident. The commander of the 
Uruguayan contingent, Lt. Col Jorge Puentes, suffered minor leg wounds in a 
landmine explosion on April 27, 1993 when he went on patrol for the first time after 
his force had arrived in Inhambane province.   
 
Emergency Care for the Injured 
 
 Although the majority of those injured by mines in government areas 
receive first aid, there is a serious problem with response and evacuation time.  
According to the twenty civilians interviewed, the average time of waiting for 
initial emergency care was three hours. The maximum wait was twelve hours. For 
soldiers, assistance was usually more rapid, often with immediate evacuation by 
vehicle. In remote areas the time it took to receive medical aid was longer. 
Several soldiers estimated that it took two days for them to reach a health clinic 




which could give them first aid treatment. Many mine victims had to be carried to 
a health clinic by foot.  They were then transferred to the nearest hospital by car, 
bus or lorry, and occasionally aircraft. 
 First aid for mine victims is usually very basic, consisting of no more than 
a bandaging of the wounds and providing comfort, perhaps with painkilling drugs. 
 The tardiness and rudimentary nature of emergency care is particularly 
disturbing not just because of the immediate suffering of the mine victim, but 
because it has been established that the length of delay between the injury and 
access to antibiotic treatment is an important determinant of infection and its 
severity in landmine blast victims.  Royal Army Corps surgeons estimate that an 
upper limit of six hours delay before antibiotic treatment appears to be the "safety 
net." Many mine victims in Mozambique do not get such treatment until they arrive 
at a hospital, on average two days after injury. (See below).  
 Traditional healers, Curandeiros, are the only source of first aid medical 
care in many areas. However, most mine victims interviewed by Human Rights 
Watch said that they were not referred to the Curandeiros and that when they 
were, the Curandeiros refused to treat them, advising their friends to take them to 
secular health care facilities.  Government soldiers also told us that Curandeiros 
refuse to treat them for mine injuries.  Curandeiros also would not prescribe 
"protective medicine" against mines, although they provided lotions and amulets 
to protect against other types of battlefield injury. A Curandeiro based in Renamo-
controlled Inhaminga explained to Human Rights Watch in June 1993 that, "Mines 
are created outside this region. My ancestors do not know them so I refer them to 
outside medicine."  
 As the war progressed health care facilities deteriorated. By 1990 the 
government reported that Renamo had looted and destroyed about 1,000 health 
clinics. Although Renamo depicted its "liberated zones" as being well-serviced, 
health care facilities were very limited, and in practice few of the government's 
health clinics were replaced by alternative Renamo ones. Renamo's clinics were 
mostly located at its major bases.  
 Until recently the treatment of those injured by mines in Renamo areas 
has been very rudimentary. The following case  illustrates the poor medical 
conditions. 
 
Case 13.  M.M. is a 38-year-old peasant farmer.  He lived in Quirione (Sofala), a 
Renamo-controlled area. In 1985 he stepped on a landmine on a frequently used 
path to his machamba. A few days before his own accident, two other people died 
in similar incidents in the locality. He suspects that the mines were planted by 




government soldiers trying to overrun the area. M.M. was evacuated to Renamo's 
nearest base which offered health facilities--Cuampunga, near the border with 
Zimbabwe. The trip lasted two weeks and he received no treatment during this 
period. The amputation and treatment were performed by a nurse. He remained 10 
months at this base (from September 1985 to July 1986), and was then sent to a 
Renamo camp at Grudja. 
 When M.M. heard about the government's amnesty law, he decided to 
leave Renamo and seek better health care in government-controlled areas. After 
six days in the bush he eventually arrived in Nhamatanda where he gave himself 
up to the local administrator. He was then treated at the local hospital for ten days 
and was afterwards evacuated to the hospital in Beira. He was again submitted to 
surgery to take away splinters. He has since returned to Nhamatanda (Sofala) 
where he lives with his mother and daughter. He has received support from the 
administration, the Red Cross, and the relief agency, Department for the 




 After emergency first aid is performed (usually in a health clinic), mine-
injured government soldiers and civilians are generally then taken to military 
hospitals, before being referred to the ICRC for specialist treatment.  While these 
hospitals function relatively well in a limited role, they are clearly not staffed or 
equipped to deal with the complicated injuries that result from mine explosions.   
 As with the response time for emergency first aid, the time needed to get 
victims to the hospital after initial care has been very problematic.  It took civilian 
landmine victims two days on average to reach the hospitals after their accidents. 
 Several victims told Human Rights Watch it took three or four days to arrive. 
 Victims in Renamo areas were even less fortunate. Limited health 
resources meant that victims had to be transported to bases large enough to 
merit basic health facilities. Even there Renamo was often unable to adequately 
care for mine victims.  Many underwent poor amputations and require further 
medical assistance. Francisco Chimoio, the Head of Renamo's Department of 
Health in Inhaminga (Sofala), the largest Renamo-held town, told Human Rights 
Watch: 
 
   We don't have adequate health facilities in our areas. 
We keep asking the international community to help the 
government of Renamo, but we have received very little help. 




Therefore, we conduct amputations under very basic 
conditions. However, we try and resolve everything in our zones 
and not refer anyone to Frelimo's health system. 
 
 From other interviews Human Rights Watch learned that this has not 
always been the case. During the war Renamo transported badly injured people to 
villages near government health clinics so that they could gain access to 
treatment in the hospitals. In the late 1980s Renamo also brought badly injured 
mine victims to the ICRC. Some of these were airlifted to ICRC clinics by ICRC 
planes. 
 Beginning in October 1992, Renamo became more restrictive about 
letting people leave its zones for humanitarian purposes. Humanitarian 
organizations informed Human Rights Watch that this was particularly the case in 
Manica, Sofala and Zambezia provinces.  At the time of Human Rights Watch's visit 
in July, there were seven civilian mine victims in a Renamo base in Mossurize 
district, southern Manica province, who urgently needed further medical 
treatment. Although an international humanitarian organization had asked that 
they be flown out for treatment, the commander of the base refused to let them go.  
 In late 1993, Renamo appears to have relaxed its control in some areas.  
But, Renamo is still reluctant to allow complete freedom of movement, even 
though this is specified in Article 3a of Protocol 3 of the October 1992 GPA which 





 Not surprisingly, rehabilitation efforts in Mozambique focus on trying to 
fit mine amputees with prosthetic devices.  Mozambique lacks the financial and 
technical resources for systematic physical therapy for mine victims.  The 
Mozambican government relies heavily on non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and foreign aid to meet the rehabilitation needs of mine victims. For 
example, the U.S. Agency for International Development has given $5.5 million to 
the Mozambican Ministry of Health over the past four years for the provision of 
artificial limbs.
5
   
 There are two organizations offering prosthesis treatment: the ICRC and 
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Handicap International. Both have waiting lists, although nobody is turned away. 
Two American NGOs, the Save the Children Federation and Health Volunteers 
Overseas, are also involved in training Mozambican health workers in orthopedic 
techniques and physiotherapy. 
 Mozambican organizations, such as Secretario de Estado de Accao Social 
(SEAS), are active across the country in drawing up lists of people needing 
prosthesis treatment, but do not themselves provide medical or rehabilitation 
treatment. Because hostel space is limited there are waiting lists. The Centro de 
Accomodacao dos Servicos Provinciais in Beira is in an appalling condition, 
starved for funds and interest from those in SEAS.  Human Rights Watch noted that 
SEAS managerial staff in Beira  
 
 
conducted their own commercial business affairs rather than social work. This 
contrasted dramatically with the efficiency and concern of the SEAS Chimoio 
office.   
 Places at the hostels are determined by how quickly a prosthesis can be 
fitted, a process which requires measurement, manufacture and fitting.  Once the 
prosthesis is ready, adjustments are made and the victim practices with the new 
limb. Adults in particular can find the training difficult. Anastacio Manihique a 
Mozambican technician at the ICRC prosthesis clinic in Maputo commented, 
"People can't imagine how difficult it is to learn to walk. Children are more flexible 
than adults, who sometimes have problems. They believe that once they get their 




 The ICRC was invited by the Ministry of Health in late 1979 to assist in 
running an orthopedic workshop which had previously been producing limbs for 
Zimbabwe African National Union amputees in the Zimbabwean war of 
independence. By late 1979 funding had dried up and the government looked for 
an alternative source of support. An ICRC team arrived in 1981 and set up a 
workshop in Maputo which began to produce plaster, and later conventional 
prostheses. In 1982/83, the ICRC began a training course for Mozambicans in 
prosthetics (eight students) and orthotics (2 students). This lasted 18 months. 
Repair workshops were then opened in Nampula (1984) and in Beira (1985). In 
1986 treatment began outside Maputo for the first time, when the ICRC opened 
pilot prosthesis workshops in Beira and Quelimane (Zambezia). Production of 




conventional legs began in Nampula in 1989. 
 With increasing prosthesis demand, the ICRC began a second training 
course in Beira in 1990 for prosthetic/orthotic technicians. In the following three 
and one-half years, 38 students attended the course. In 1990 polypropylene 
technology and Debre-Zeit knees were introduced, reducing dependence on 
erratic local timber supplies. At the end of 1990 an amputee hostel was built in 
Nampula. This facilitated access to the ICRC workshop for patients from remote 
districts and the northern provinces. In 1992 the ICRC fitted 1,027 prostheses, 
making a total of 5,891 since it started operations in 1981. In 1992 its doctors 
conducted 982 amputations (not all mine-related).  
 
 The Ministry of Health refers all relevant orthopedic cases to either ICRC 
or Handicap International clinics. The numbers coming forward for treatment at 
ICRC clinics have not always been consistent. In the late 1980s numbers declined 
and the ICRC embarked on a media campaign through local radio, encouraging 
mine victims to come forward for treatment. This was successful and the numbers 
of patients increased to their previous levels. 
 With the signing of the October 1992 GPA, the ICRC is preparing to 
withdraw most of its staff and operations from Mozambique and is looking to hand 
over the management and funding of its prostheses workshops in Beira, Maputo, 
Nampula, and Quelimane to other foreign or local organizations.  The U.S. Agency 
for International Development has assured funding for the Maputo center in 1994-
95. The Portugal-based Santa Casa da Misericordia de Lisboa, a powerful institute 
which receives funds from the Portuguese state lottery, is currently negotiating to 
take over the ICRC's southern operations. One possibility is to have Handicap 
International servicing the north and the Santa Casa da Misericordia servicing the 
south. 
 
Handicap International Activities 
 
 HI has been active in Mozambique since 1986. After opening a prothesis 
workshop in Inhambane in 1986, it has expanded in recent years, opening 
additional workshops in Nampula (1987), Tete (1990) and Vilanculos (Inhambane). 
It hopes to open two new ones in Pemba (Cabo Delgado) and Lichinga (Niassa) and 
possibly take over management of the ICRC's facilities in Nampula. HI's capacity to 
manufacture and fit prostheses is much smaller than the ICRC. HI has also begun 
a mine awareness campaign that will initially be focused on Inhambane and Tete 
provinces.  Recently, Handicap International has launched an effort to lobby the 




Mozambican government and Renamo to provide a pension for disabled veterans 
of the war, as stipulated by law in Mozambique. 
 A prosthesis can be expected to last two or three years, but children 
require a new one at least every year, as they outgrow the old one. This means that 
prosthesis manufacture will likely have to be maintained at a level of thousands 
per year for the next sixty to seventy years.  
 Human Rights Watch interviewed one victim from the struggle for 
independence. 
 
Case 14.  A.P. was born in Chimoio in 1949 and was a black lorry driver in the 
Portuguese army. His lorry hit a Frelimo mine in Antadora, near Macomia in Cabo 
Delgado in 1971. He lost his right leg. He was evacuated to Mueda, where he 
underwent surgery and was than transferred to Nampula for further treatment at 
the military hospital. Now living in Chimoio, he returns to Beira every three years 
to receive a new prosthesis from the ICRC. 
 
Need for a U.N. Trust Fund for Mine Victims 
 
 The deadly legacy of landmines will plague the people of Mozambique 
for many decades.  While vastly expanded mine clearance operations are urgently 
needed, the response of the international community and the Mozambican 
authorities should not be focused only on mine clearance. The plight of the 
victims of mines must also be addressed. 
 In October 1993, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution calling on 
the Secretary General to assess the advisability of a voluntary trust fund to 
finance mine clearance programs and operations.
6
  While Human Rights Watch 
supports the creation of such a fund, it also calls for the creation of a parallel 
voluntary U.N. Trust Fund for mine victims.  
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 In Mozambique and in many other mine-stricken nations, there is a 
desperate need for additional funds to help mine victims survive, adapt to their 
handicap and rebuild their lives.  These funds would be devoted to the 
enhancement of medical care for mine victims, with an emphasis on 
rehabilitation services, such as prostheses, physical therapy, and therapeutic 




treatment, as well as mine awareness schemes which are needed not only to 
teach people to avoid mines, but also to demonstrate that victims can still live a 
full life and play a constructive role in society.  
 Local and international nongovernmental organizations could apply to 
the Trust Fund for grants for programs to assist mine victims. Landmine 
producers and exporters should contribute to the Trust Fund.  Companies profiting 
from mine clearance operations should also consider contributing, particularly in 
light of the fact that some of the commercial mine clearance companies 
operating or hoping to operate in Mozambique employ non-Mozambicans who 






 THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 
 
 In its July 1993 report on international demining, the United States 
Department of State says of Mozambique: 
 
  Mozambique is a classic example of how mines inhibit 
refugee repatriation and hinder economic reconstruction. 
Nation-building efforts in Mozambique will be heavily 
dependent upon the success of U.N. and other demining 
operations.1 
 
 Similarly, a report from the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on its mission to Mozambique in March and 
April 1993 states: 
 
  Beside other difficulties which stand against the 
development of the destroyed country, there are a large 
quantity of landmines and other dangerous ordnance in 
Mozambique which are the sad result of the long civil war.  The 
danger of these mines exists not only on main roads and former 
important strategical points but are also a reality on remote 
roads and paths on farmlands and unused rural land nearly 
everywhere in the country.2 
 
 These are dramatic statements which emphasize the serious social and 
economic impact of landmines in Mozambique.  But, they are also somewhat 
misleading.  They generalize too much; not all of Mozambique is greatly affected 
by mines.  The distribution--and danger--of landmines in different areas directly 
reflects the varied patterns of the war and the military aims of both sides.  
Moreover, some officials from local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
involved in repatriation efforts believe that the danger of mines to refugees has 
been exaggerated, or at least overemphasized in light of other problems facing 
returnees. 
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 Still, it is clear that landmines have had and will continue to have a 
powerful negative impact on Mozambique.  Many of the landmines laid by Renamo 
in particular were deliberately intended to cause maximum social and economic 
disruption.  Key Renamo objectives in the war were to disrupt the economy, 
disrupt land communications, isolate government-held areas from each other, 
and isolate rural areas from government centers.  To accomplish these objectives, 
Renamo mined fields, roads, paths and bridges.   
 Perhaps the most devastating use of landmines was the random 
dissemination of mines in fields and along their access paths to stop peasants 
from producing food. This tactic was employed primarily by Renamo, especially in 
the south, although government forces also laid mines for this purpose in the 
central provinces, albeit to a lesser extent than Renamo.  Even though the war is 
over, these mines continue to pose a serious threat to civilians, especially as 




 At the time of the peace accord, there were more than 2 million 
Mozambican refugees in the six border nations, in addition to 4-to-5 million 
internally displaced people.  The UNHCR estimated that as of the end of 1993, more 
than 650,000 Mozambican refugees had returned, mainly to the provinces of Tete, 
Manica, Sofala, and Zambezia.  It is estimated that nearly 400 refugees are now 
returning each day. 
 In particular, large numbers of the more than 1 million Mozambican 
refugees in Malawi started crossing back, mostly into Tete province, as soon as 
the ceasefire was formally signed. They were anxious to return and claim their 
land before others grabbed it, and to start rebuilding their lives. 
 Many more Mozambican refugees are preparing to return home if the 
peace holds.  Up to 1.6 million Mozambican refugees are still located in the six 
neighboring countries, of which some 1 million are registered with UNHCR.
3
  
UNHCR-organized repatriation has begun from Zimbabwe and Swaziland.  
Repatriation from Tanzania will begin in 1994.   Plans for repatriation from Malawi, 
Zambia, and South Africa are still being formulated.  
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 The entire repatriation process is expected to take some three years to 
complete. Its total costs are expected to be close to $200 million. The UNHCR 
claims that when completed, it will have been the biggest UNHCR repatriation 
operation ever undertaken in Africa.  This may not turn out to be the case because 
many of the refugees will have returned home on their own accord.  The UNHCR 
repatriation process is voluntary, although the Zimbabwean government, in 
addition to South Africa, appears keen to ensure that all refugees leave. 
 The situation for the estimated 250,000 unregistered refugees in South 
Africa has been especially uncertain because the UNHCR has not had a presence 
there.  The South African military has been deporting an average of 200 
Mozambican refugees daily.  However, after extensive discussions, the UNHCR and 
the governments of South Africa and Mozambique signed an agreement on 
October 15, 1993 under which they will cooperate in the repatriation of refugees.  
Details must still be worked out, but it is expected that organized repatriation will 
begin in the first quarter of 1994. 
 
 The Mine Threat 
 
 Mines are an obvious threat to refugees and internally displaced people 
when they return to their villages and lands after months or years of absence.  As 
noted in a recent report by the U.S. Committee for Refugees, "In a repatriation 
filled with uncertainties, one of the few certainties is that some refugees who 
managed to survive years of war, drought, and crowded refugee camps will return 




 It may well be that landmines will take a greater toll during peacetime, 
as hundreds of thousands of people return home, than they did during wartime.  
According to one account, in Tete province during September and October 1993, 
fifteen people were injured and two died as a result of mines; eleven of these were 
men returning home from Malawian border camps.
5
  Mines planted since people 
fled from their homes pose the greatest danger.  In its report cited above, the 
UNHRC noted, 
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  The local population that remained in Mozambique is 
familiar with the danger and is aware of affected areas.  
Nevertheless, there are serious injuries caused by landmines 
on a daily basis... It is therefore to be feared that the number of 
victims of landmines and other unexploded ordnance will, with 
the start of the main repatriation, dramatically increase, if the 




 Alice Simbane is a refugee who returned home after three years in a 
refugee camp in Zimbabwe. In December 1992 she told Human Rights Watch in a 
Maputo hospital, "I was excited by the peace. I and my family hoped to return to 
peace. We wanted no memories of war. However, my brother on the long walk 
home stepped on a landmine and has lost his foot. What have I done to deserve 
this? They told me we have peace." 
 
Case 15.  J.B. is a 20- to 25-year-old peasant farmer. She lived in a Renamo-
controlled area, near Maringue, until mid-1990. Because of drought and hunger, 
she and her family were trying to reach government-controlled areas, when she 
stepped on a landmine near Casa Banana. She received first aid in the village, and 
was evacuated to hospital in Beira one week later by military helicopter where her 
left leg was amputated.  
 
 
 Local workers told the U.S. Committee for Refugees that the refugee 
transit center in Capiridzanje (Moatize district, Tete province) may be partially 
surrounded by mines, some less than 500 yards beyond the center's perimeter, 
even though it is astride a major re-entry path for returnees from Malawi.
7
    
 Many externally-based Mozambican refugees are aware of and 
concerned about the risks mines might pose when they repatriate. Francesca 
Dagnino of the Italian nongovernmental organization Centro Informazione E 
Educazione Allo Sviluppo (CIES) is working with Mozambican refugees in 
Zimbabwe. She told Human Rights Watch, "People are worried and we get reports 
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of refugees who pass through unfamiliar areas and have got killed or injured by 
mines. My organization is looking to have some main route ways professionally 
cleared of mines to avoid this type of accident." 
 Mines are probably a greater impediment to organized repatriation 
efforts than individual, spontaneous repatriation, since antivehicle mines on 
particular roads will have to be cleared before refugees can be transported back 
to their home areas.  Despite the tragic experience of the Simbanes and others, 
those repatriating on their own on foot can often utilize much-travelled paths and 
trackways known to be safe.  
 Indeed, many thousands of refugees are returning home along 
uncleared, but well-used paths and roads known to be safe.  There are well-
established safe routes through the substantial minefields which border South 
Africa near Massingir (Gaza), along the Malawian border at Mandimba (Niassa) 
and through a 72-mile-long minefield along the southern Zimbabwean border in 
Chicualacuala district (Gaza). 
 In fact, despite the dangers, the picture across much of the country is 
that repatriation will not be badly affected by landmines.  There are only a few of 
the large defensive mine fields. In Angonia district (Tete) there are very few mines, 
as has finally been recognized by the UNHCR. Mines were mostly laid on the short 
dirt roads to Malawi via Domue and Tsangano. The Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) 
program is clearing the main roads in Mutarara district to ensure that those 
southern Tete roads are open for repatriation traffic. (See Chapter 6 for more on 
the NPA program).  The Zimbabwean company, Mine-Tech, hopes to clear the roads 
used by returnees from Zimbabwe into Manica province.  Although some 
repatriation routes remain blocked there are usually other ways around mined 
areas. 
 With the end of mine laying, many major paths are likely to be clear.  
Traffic has returned to many roads, even those that have not been professionally 
cleared.  In the May/June issue of Africa Report, BBC World Service journalist Dan 
Isaacs wrote: 
 
  As the de-mining team works its way methodically 
down the road, a small pick-up truck arrives. It is weighted 
down with passengers, chickens, sacks of corn. This is the daily 
bus service from Gorongosa to Carvelo, 18 miles up the road, 
and they want to get past. "I'm making the journey almost every 
day now, and if there were any [mines] along here, we would 
have hit them by now. And besides, now the war is over, the 









 Local knowledge of where the mines are located is often very good.  In 
one instance, Human Rights Watch saw locals use pieces of cloth and sticks as 
warnings of mined areas on a small path to a water source.  There are also 
examples of peasant farmers cultivating in fields around small mounds which 
identify where mines are present. 
 Officials from local NGOs dealing with repatriation believe that the mine 
threat for returnees is exaggerated. They argue that money is better spent 
rebuilding health clinics and schools and educating people properly about the 
dangers of mines. There has been criticism of the UNHCR and some NGOs for 
having frightened people by overemphasizing the dangers of landmines, when 
other risks such as cholera and malaria may pose a greater threat to returnees. A 
local government official in Chimoio, the provincial capital of Manica province, 
told Human Rights Watch in June 1993: 
 
  The reports from the local administrators suggest that 
mines are in most localities not a serious problem. Only one 
administrator has contacted me saying that children can't go 
back to school because there are mines in the playground. 
Mavonde is a bad area, so is Nguawala. 
 
 Equally dangerous, and often more prolific, are the live ammunition, 
rocket-propelled grenades and other unexploded ordnance which litter towns and 
settlements after years of war. Gurkha Security Guards (GSG) often spent their day 
off from mine-clearing roads attempting to clear Inhaminga of unexploded RPG-7 
rocket-propelled grenades and other ordnance. They also discovered an 
unexploded and modified Russian RBK-250 bomb sticking out of the soil upside 
down near huts, with children sitting on its fins. This bomb was safely destroyed in 
July, with ONUMOZ permission. (See Chapter 6 for more on the GSG project). 
 It appears that the impact of landmines on different areas of 
Mozambique varies greatly.  Where there is a bad mine problem, the effects on the 
local community are immediately obvious. One victim from Vunduzi, near 
Gorongosa (Sofala), told Human Rights Watch that he knew of between 40 and 50 
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victims of antipersonnel mines from his area. Another person from a village near 
Gorongosa told Human Rights Watch that she knows five other people from her 
village who had been injured by mines. In Maputo and Gaza provinces certain 
areas are badly mined. One medical doctor at Maputo's Central Hospital told 
Human Rights Watch that the majority of amputees he operated on came from in 
and around Manhica. The ICRC's files confirm that Manhica is particularly bad. 
 Mines may take their greatest toll when returnees and long- established 
communities lower their caution and start walking on seldom-used paths and 
entering less frequented areas to begin new cultivation.  But even returnees to 
already densely populated areas face risks until they become thoroughly 
reintegrated into the village. 
 
Case 16.  F.V. is a 45- to 50-year-old peasant farmer. He stepped on a mine on April 
30, 1992 in Massiana (Maputo) while cutting wood to repair his house. Following 
treatment he returned home and says that despite fear of the presence of other 
landmines in his area, displaced people have begun to return there and are 
building their houses. 
 
Mine Awareness Initiatives 
 
 Educating the returnees about the risks of mines and raising the 
awareness of mines in local communities is critical. But this education needs to 
be based on a correct assessment of the threat posed by mines in a particular 
district so as not to be overly alarmist.  Mine awareness initiatives also need to be 
designed around what the people already know. If properly designed, such 
schemes will deal with the mines problem where the dangers are greatest--along 
the bush paths. 
 Mine awareness programs in general are aimed at teaching civilians 
how to recognize and avoid mines, and the proper steps to follow if mines are 
found (i.e., mark them, inform community leaders, wait for experts to disarm them). 
 Mine awareness programs usually consist of verbal instruction sessions, and the 
widespread distribution of brochures, leaflets, postures, and other means of 
alerting the entire community, from the very young to the very old, to the danger of 
mines.  
 Handicap International and Norges HandiKapforbund printed 10,000 
color brochures in Portuguese for children in June 1993 entitled "The day I found a 
mine."  Through pictures and simple text it tells the story of a child who sees a 
mine in the bush but is stopped by an adult from touching it. The child is then told 




by the adult why she should not touch mines and that she must tell the elders and 
everybody about its presence. This brochure is being distributed initially in Tete 
province amongst refugees there as part of a wider HI and Norges 
Handikapforbund campaign. The campaign hopes to use military mine victims 
from the Associacao dos Deficientes Militares Mocambicanos (ADEMIMO) to 
distribute it and to lecture returning refugees on the danger of mines. Schools, 
health centers, local administrators and curandeiros are being asked to 
participate in the campaign and to help set up in each community a group which 
will collate new reports of landmines in their locality. HI has targeted the districts 
of Angonia, Mutarara, Moatize, Changara and Tsangano for this campaign. HI has 
also set up a mobile orthopedic clinic to visit several of these districts once a 
month.  It is unclear why HI is targeting Angonia and Tsangano because there are 
very few mines in these localities.  
 Handicap International and the Mines Advisory Group are discussing a 
similar mines awareness campaign in Inhambane province for internally 
displaced people returning to their rural homes after years of living in the towns. 
This will focus on the districts of Zavala, Inharrime, Jangamo, Panda, Homoine, 
Inhambane, Morrumbene, Massinga, Funhalouro, Mabote, Vilankulo, Inhassoro, 
and Govuro. 
 In collaboration with Handicap International and UNHCR, UNICEF will also 
assist in the mine awareness initiative. The BBC has been contracted to produce a 
"Mine Awareness" program to spread the message to the general public and 
particularly to children and returnees (who may not be aware of newly mined 
areas since their departure). The plan is to have a special spot allocated on a local 
radio program to instruct people what to do if they see a mine and whom to 
contact in case of injury. These programs will be transmitted from Zambezia. The 
program also plans to develop a "Soap Opera" with the BBC World Service at some 
later date. The "Soap Opera" will trace the adventures of returning Mozambicans 
from Malawi and contain stories about mine incidents and tips on mine 
awareness. It will also be transmitted by the BBC's Portuguese Service from 
London in order to reach Mozambican refugees in neighboring countries. 
 A mine awareness campaign was also conducted in Malawi's six 
southern districts. Organized by the U.S.-based International Rescue Committee 
and Norwegian People's Aid workers, the project was originally going to train up to 
2,000 people in mine awareness over a three month period.  These people were 
then going to work among returning refugees. Because of the delays over mine 
clearance in Tete province this training did not begin until September 1992 and 
was reduced to six weeks of training for several hundred people.  In a case of good 




intentions going for naught, the UNHCR supplied mine awareness videos for use 
on Malawian television; however, Malawi does not have a television station and 
the videos are in Portuguese, while most refugees speak various vernacular 
dialects and understand little Portuguese.   
 A mine awareness program for Mozambican refugees in Zimbabwe is 
underway as well, organized at UNHCR's request by the Zimbabwean HelpAge 
Refugee Program.   Initially, Norwegian People's Aid was contracted to train 17 
HelpAge workers in mine awareness techniques.  These HelpAge will then train 
120 refugees, who will in turn teach other refugees.  This program is making use of 
actual size models of mines, and posters and T-shirts with the simple message (in 
Shona) "Danger Mines" in red; the red matches a boy's leg being blown off.  
HelpAge had initially been frustrated with material sent from the UNHRC in Geneva, 
which were largely English language with confusing graphics; HelpAge found 
much greater understanding and interest in the community in the mine 
awareness program after it employed a local artist who designed materials based 
on local field testing. 
 In addition to its activities in Malawi and Zimbabwe, the UNHCR has 
established mine awareness workshops in refugee camps and settlements in 
Swaziland, and intends to do the same in Tanzania, Zambia, and South Africa. 
 The Italian non-governmental organization Centro Informazione E 
Educazione Allo Sviluppo expects to begin a mines awareness project in the 





 Landmines have damaged significant parts of Mozambique's economic 
infrastructure, and will continue to disrupt--and make more costly--efforts to 
rebuild economically for years to come.  Railways essential to commerce, power 
lines needed for domestic energy consumption and export earnings, valuable 
game parks, and many other areas are impacted by landmines.   
 Renamo regularly targeted railways for attack during the war. In addition 
to derailing trains and blowing up bridges with explosives, Renamo occasionally 
used landmines in its ambush attacks on the trains themselves, leaving the mines 
behind after attacks to make reconstruction work more difficult.  
 The first recorded Renamo mine attack on a railway was in October 1980 
when a government patrol came across a group laying a mine on the Beira to 
Mutare (Zimbabwe) line; the patrol shot at the mine which exploded and killed the 




guerrillas. Mines were more frequently used against trains on the southern Goba 
line via Swaziland and the Ressano Garcia line to South Africa. Between November 
1988 and February 1989 mines were used in two Renamo attacks on the Ressano 
Garcia line resulting in six people killed and 47 people injured.  Many of the 
injuries were from derailment. 
 All the main railway lines are operational again except the Dondo-
Moatize line, which was first sabotaged by Renamo with mines in 1981. This is an 
important economic route because of the coal mines at Moatize (Tete), with a 
branch line from the important Sena sugar complex which travels up the Shire 
river and enters Malawi. Due to Renamo sabotage the railway has been 
completely closed since 1984. Human Rights Watch flew over the track and noted 
two trains stuck where they were ambushed with landmines along the stretch 
from Dondo to Inhaminga (Sofala).  
 Rehabilitating the line will take at least two years and many millions of 
dollars, not least because the railway bridge which crosses the Zambezi river at 
Mutarara, at 3.6 kilometers the longest bridge in Africa, had two 90 meter spans 
damaged in September 1986. Renamo admitted to Human Rights Watch that there 
are still unexploded mines along the railway.  
 Rehabilitation of the power lines from the 2,000 megawatt Cahora Bassa 
hydro-electric dam in Tete province is also affected by mines. These lines are held 
up by pylons along a 890 kilometer span between South Africa and the dam. Some 
1,416 pylons were damaged by Renamo between 1982 and 1988, denying the 
government valuable energy export earnings from South Africa. The cost of 
reconstructing the power line is currently estimated to be $125 million. 
Rehabilitation work is barely underway, and it will be slow. Many of the pylons are 
surrounded by protective mines placed by the government, but Renamo also 
placed booby-trapped mines to deter reconstruction. Some stretches of the power 
lines may be so badly mined and dangerous to clear that a new line will have to be 
built and the old mined stretch fenced off. Initial estimates are that the power line 
will not become operational until 1996 at the earliest. 
 National game parks such as Gorongosa (Sofala) and the planned 
Mozambican extension of South Africa's Kruger National Game Park in southern 
Mozambique will require mine clearance. Mozambique's elephants not only had to 
survive the soldiers who would kill them for their ivory and meat; in the mid-1980s, 
when their numbers were greater, elephants were found maimed by 
antipersonnel mines or killed outright by antitank mines. 
 
The Social Plight of the Victims 





 The victims suffer most, as no money can return their lost sight or limbs. 
Many have also suffered severe hardship and social rejection following their 
accident. A number of organizations are involved in efforts to ease the plight of 
landmine victims. 
 The Associacao dos Deficientes Mocambicanos (ADEMO) was founded in 
1989 with financial assistance from Handicap International. ADEMO sought to be 
an umbrella organization for all handicapped people and was initially closely 
linked with the Frelimo party. ADEMO has offices in every province but is weak in 
the north. With UNICEF funds it started a monthly newsletter in August 1992 and 
has worked closely with Handicap International in Inhambane and Tete provinces. 
 With an increasing number of people disabled due to war injuries, the 
government-linked Secretario de Estado de Accao Social (SEAS) sought 
government support for a physical rehabilitation and social reintegration 
program for the physically handicapped. SEAS proposed to the Ministry of 
Employment that employers should ensure that handicapped individuals 
constituted one percent of their workforce.  However, this scheme failed to get 
government support.  
 An initiative by SEAS for handicapped soldiers had better results. Starting 
in December 1991, SEAS assisted handicapped soldiers in setting up their own 
pressure group organization. In November 1992, the Associacao dos Deficientes 
Militares Mocambicanos (ADEMIMO) was launched. ADEMIMO has since suffered 
from a lack of funds. In cooperation with non-handicapped soldier groups it is 
currently pushing for unpaid salaries and compensation. 
 ADEMO and SEAS have an ambivalent relationship. Terezinha da Silva of 
SEAS described ADEMO to Human Rights Watch as "an organization that has little 
local roots and is very weak; completely dependent on foreign funding such as 
Handicap International. For this reason its activities reflect outside interests 
rather than the realities on the ground."  
 Relations between ADEMO and ADEMIMO are poor because ADEMO, 
believing it should be an umbrella organization for the handicapped, campaigned 
vigorously against ADEMIMO's creation. There is little liaison between them. 
Several of the amputees interviewed by Human Rights Watch were critical of 
ADEMO, claiming that the organization did little for them and spent most of its 
resources on its own management.  
 Because of the lack of any significant support from the state, amputees 
have on their own adopted differing survival strategies.  
 




Case 17.  A beggar outside the main Interfranca shopping complex in Maputo 
described to Human Rights Watch why he spent the whole day outside the 
complex begging. 
 
  I have to survive so I spend the day outside here 
asking ONUMOZs [expatriates] to give me money. The 
government doesn't care about us so I live off what ONUMOZs 
give me. Mozambicans also don't give. ONUMOZ is the one that 
has been sent to give. 
 
 Physical disability is not all that victims suffer. Discrimination and 
rejection often follow. 
 
Case 18.  S.A. was fired in 1992, after he had been maimed by a landmine and the 
company paid no compensation. S.A. wrote a complaint to the provincial 
department of employment, but has received no answer so far. Ever since he has 
been living at the Centro de Acomodacao in Beira. Late in 1992 he tried to go to 
Zimbabwe, where he has a brother, but the customs officers at the Zimbabwean 
border did not allow him into Zimbabwe. He lives in hope of a positive answer to 
his complaint, and will again try to go to Zimbabwe to live with his brother. 
 
Case 19.  R.S. from Sussundenga (Manica province) is 63 years old. He was a 
tractor driver at the Empresa de Citrinos de Chimoio. In 1980 he was driving a 
tractor in an orange tree plantation when the vehicle hit an antitank mine.  He lost 
his left leg.  The same day two other tractors drove over landmines in the same 
plantation. Renamo had briefly occupied the area a week before, and people were 
suspicious of the existence of landmines, but nobody did anything to prevent the 
movement of people or vehicles. R.S. had his first prosthesis fit in 1982 in Maputo. 
He currently lives in Chimoio. He works in his machamba with his family and goes 
regularly to Beira for new prostheses. After his accident the Empresa de Citrinos 
payed him MT 2,444,096.00 (just over $500 at current rates, a small fortune at the 
time), and fired him. 
 
 The difficulties faced by female amputees are particularly severe. Three 
of the women interviewed by Human Rights Watch had been abandoned by their 
husbands for other women after their landmine accidents. Life for amputated men 
is also difficult, with several having had their wives leave them. Unmarried young 
men and women feared that they would not find a partner because of their 




disability. The majority of amputees interviewed survived day-to-day with family 
help, but complained of feeling a burden on their families. In separate interviews 
several immediate family members of amputees admitted that it was difficult for 
them to look after a handicapped person.  
 However, with few exceptions the amputees were trying to continue to 
make a living by producing crops from their family machambas. Those with some 
basic education hope to find secretarial work or work as telephone operators. But 
such jobs are scarce and employers often discriminate against amputees unless 
they come from their family area or have been schooled together. 
 Although most amputees interviewed by Human Rights Watch responded 
to their handicaps with fatalism, some clearly expressed their bitterness. 
   
Case 20.  Manuel, a demobilised FAM soldier, feels diminished for having to beg to 
survive, and is particularly angry with Frelimo, whom he accuses of having used 
him (as a soldier in the liberation war and afterwards) and ditching him now that 
he is no longer physically able after stepping on a landmine in 1990. Manuel also 
complained about the Ministry of Defence and other government agencies who, in 
his opinion, should take the responsibility for the necessary travel arrangements 
to send him back to his native village, where he can have a more dignified life. In 
Beira he told Human Rights Watch: 
 
  I served Frelimo all these years, and now I am no more 
than a limping beggar. Where are my comrades, where are the 
chefes [leaders]? Nobody cares. I gave my youth, and this is 
what I get in return, total indifference. Why can't they send me 
back home to my mother who will certainly take better care of 
me? I just want to go home, I ask no more. 
 
 With little state assistance to amputees, the work of the humanitarian 
NGOs such as Handicap International is becoming increasingly important. HI's 
rehabilitation center in Inhambane offers amputees basic counselling and 
training to improve their skills. Amputees passing through the center are 
encouraged to participate in handicrafts and farm activities while waiting for 
their prosthesis. They are also offered basic literacy lessons in the afternoons. But 
some sort of longer term provisions is required for amputees who have become 
completely destitute. Teresa is one of these. 
 
Case 21.  Teresa lives in Cancinza (Sofala) with her sister who is a widow. Her 




parents died a long time ago. Her two brothers died in a Renamo ambush. Her 
husband died of cholera. Teresa and her sister live on whatever earnings they 
obtain from their small machamba. In the last few years relief assistance (food, 
clothing, etc.) was given by the Red Cross and other donors, but following the 





 MINE CLEARANCE INITIATIVES 
 
 Despite the obvious and urgent need for demining, and despite 
increased international attention to that need, mine clearance activities in 
Mozambique are moving forward slowly and fitfully.  After much haggling, at the 
end of 1992 the government and Renamo agreed to a road clearance pilot project 
by a private British firm.  Shortly thereafter, the United Nations announced a 
national mine clearance master plan which focused on priority road clearance.  
Almost a year later, only two major professional clearance operations are 
underway, one of which is partially financed by the U.N.  Mine clearance initiatives 
have been plagued by domestic Mozambican politics and bureaucracy, as well as 
the U.N.'s own bureaucracy. In the meantime, random and uncoordinated 
clearance by the government and Renamo is taking place on a small scale across 
the country.  Mozambicans continue to take daily risks on paths and roads and in 
fields that have not been professionally cleared. 
 
GSG Pilot Project 
 
 In their first joint attempt to deal with the landmine problem, the 
Mozambican government and Renamo agreed at the December 31, 1992 meeting 
of the Supervisory and Control Commission (CSC) to a list of 25 priority roads for 
mine clearance.1  This list had been drawn up by the ICRC and U.N. World Food 
Program (WFP).       
 At the same meeting, the government and Renamo agreed to hire a 
British company, Gurkha Security Guards Ltd. (GSG), to clear some of the mined 
roads in central Mozambique.2  The agreement ended a dispute over who should 
be contracted. Renamo wanted to hire a South African security company, Minerva, 
and the government wanted the Zimbabwe army to clear mines.  The government 
                                                                    
    1  There is some confusion about the number of roads on this list.  Although the number is 
often reported as 28, the list actually contains 27 routes.  However, two of the stretches of 
road (Inhaminga-Inhamitanga and Inhamitanga-Marromeu) are duplicative of other routes 
on the list, leaving 25 that need to be cleared. 
    2  In October 1992, under contract to the WFP, another private British firm, Defence 
Systems Limited, had conducted a two-week mine assessment survey of 2,000 kilometers 
of road in central Mozambique. 






opposed Minerva's bid because it was linked with Garth Barrett, a former officer in 
the Rhodesian SAS who was active in training Renamo when it was based in 
Rhodesia.  Renamo opposed using the Zimbabwe army, fearing that the 
Zimbabweans would be partisan and favor the government during clearance 
operations. 
 GSG is a privately-owned British company, founded in 1990, specializing 
in security and explosive ordnance disposal throughout the world. GSG mainly 
recruits former British and Indian Army Gurkha soldiers and officers.  GSG has 
operated in Mozambique since 1990, when it was contracted to protect Lonrho de 
Mocambique (Lomaco) commercial interests against Renamo attack. In this 
capacity GSG technicians were frequently required to clear areas and roads 
which had been mined or booby-trapped. 
 On January 26, 1993, GSG began its formal mine clearance operation in 
Mozambique in cooperation with Lomaco. The program is directed by the U.N. and 
is funded by the European Community. The aim is to clear designated roads of 
mines and unexploded ordnance, in order to allow relief vehicles carrying food 
and other forms of aid to reach more remote regions. GSG's initial one month 
contract was extended in February for two months, in April for three months, and in 
July for five months so that additional roads could be cleared.   
 The contract called for clearance of six roads in Sofala province and one 
in Gaza province, namely: 
 
a. Gorongosa-Vunduzi     (43 kms) 
b. Gorongosa-Canda      (35 kms) 
c. Goonda-Dombe      (70 kms) 
d. Fundeze-Macossa-Maringue-Canxixe   (130 kms) 
e. Muxungue-Chibabava-Magunde    (30 kms) 
f. Dondo-Inhaminga-Caia     (250 kms) 
g. Nalazi-Dindiza (Gaza province)    (78 kms) 
 
 GSG's clearance initially concentrated on roads north of Beira. By the end 
of February three priority routes had been cleared:  Gorongosa-Vunduzi; 
Gorongosa-Canda; and Goonda-Dombe. The first two routes did not yield any 
mines, but 13 antipersonnel mines were found on the  
 
 




Goonda-Dombe road. Unscheduled clearance of the Gorongosa-Inchope road also 
produced some thirty mines, mostly PMN mines at bridge footings, as well as 
several PMD-6 box mines.  
 In March, GSG began clearing mines between Inhaminga and Caia at an 
average pace of 3 kilometers a day. The road was cleared by July 17th.
3
 GSG only 
found two PMN antipersonnel mines by a damaged bridge.  
 GSG's team was made up of five ex-Gurkha engineers under the 
command of an ex-British Army Royal Engineer Non-Commissioned Officer, and an 
interpreter/driver. Frelimo and Renamo also had representatives with the team 
who advised where mines were likely to be and who monitored the clearing 
progress.  
 GSG used only hand clearance techniques because mechanical means, 
such as flails and rollers, are expensive and would damage the roads and fail to 
produce the high standard of clearance required for humanitarian purposes.
4
  
 After months of delay in payment by the European Community, some 
funds for GSG came through on July 27th.  GSG's contract was extended for a 
further five months, with operations beginning in September and ending in 
February 1994.  The contract called for five additional teams, each with one EOD 
specialist, one expatriate medic and five Gurkhas, to clear roads selected by the 
U.N. World Food Program (WFP) from among the 25 roads approved by the CSC in 
December 1992.  The E.C. has indicated that it will not renew the contract when it 
expires, but UNOHAC has asked GSG to continue clearance on the Inhaminga-
Dondo road and the Casa Banana airstrip. 
 A GSG document dated December 17, 1993 indicated that the following 
had been cleared:  11 kilometers of the 45.5 kilometer Caia-Chiramba route; 1.15 
kilometers of the 9.6 kilometer Casa Luis-Espungebera route; and, 1.4 kilometers 
of the 9.3 kilometer Vanduzi-Casa Banana route.  There were no mines 
encountered on any of these routes. 
 The first mine injury associated with the GSG operation occured in 
November 1993, when a Frelimo soldier working with GSG stepped on a Type 72 
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 For a detailed explanation of the demining process and various mine clearance 
techniques, see Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, The Arms Project and Physicians for Human 
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mine.  He lost his toes.  GSG has said that its South African-manufactured Barcom 
mine detector failed to register the mine.  While the Type 72 is known as a low-
metal-content mine that is difficult to detect, GSG told Human Rights Watch that it 
dismantled another Type 72 found at the same site and that it contained no metal 
whatsoever. 
 In December 1993, a vehicle hit a landmine on a road already cleared by 
GSG.  There were no injuries.  The incident occured on the River Pungwe to Caia 
road, about two kilometers south of Caia.  GSG believes that it was a Type 72 mine 
that had been washed into the road by the rains. 
 
The U.N. Mine Clearance Plan 
 
 U.N. Special Mines Expert Patrick Blagden unveiled ONUMOZ's "Mine 
Clearance Plan for Mozambique" on January 26, 1993. During the presentation 
Blagden said that neither he nor other U.N mine experts had travelled extensively 
in Mozambique, and that he had not seen any Mozambican minefields.  Human 
Rights Watch has learned that this was a result of pressure from within ONUMOZ 
and the U.N. Department of Humanitarian Affairs to be seen to be acting quickly on 
the mines issue, particularly because of continued incidents involving NGOs and 
U.N. agencies.  Not until March 26th did a U.N. Program Manager and Chief 
Technical Manager for Mine Clearance arrive to coordinate the U.N.'s mine 
clearance plan. The Manager, Andre Millorit, arrived directly from the U.N. mine 
clearance operation in Afghanistan. 
 The U.N. plan for Mozambique incorporates many elements drawn from 
the U.N.'s experience in the clearance programs in Afghanistan and Cambodia. It 
also draws upon Blagden's own experience during commercial clearance 
operations in Kuwait. The plan's long-term objective is for Mozambique to carry 
out its own demining operations and serve as a source of expertise for other mine 
clearance operations in Africa. 
 The first stage calls for identification of some 2,000 kilometers of road as 
priority for clearance.  Despite its vast size, Mozambique has only an estimated 
29,000 kilometers of roads, of which 5,000 are paved. Remaining roads are of 
stabilized earth or simple tracks.   
 
 The plan indicates priority routes should be those necessary for: the 
humanitarian transport of food to feeding centers in the areas most seriously 
affected by drought; the establishment and administration of transit centers for 
refugees; and, access to assembly areas for demobilized soldiers. 




 As a practical matter, the U.N. has accepted the list of 25 priority roads for 
demining that was approved by the CSC in December.   
 The second stage of the U.N. plan calls for identifying and clearing routes 
necessary for the return of refugees to Mozambique from neighbouring states and 
for the economic development of Mozambique.  The third stage calls for 
establishing a school in Mozambique to train mine clearers who will then 
complete the clearance of the remaining mines. 
 The U.N. plan calls for the use of private, commercial firms for mine 
clearance at the outset, because "civil contractors have the advantage that they 
can start clearance work almost immediately."   
 According to the original U.N. timeframe, contractors were to be on the 
ground in Mozambique at the end of May 1993 to begin road clearance in 
conjunction with the government's Direccao National de Estradas e Pontes 
(National Ministry for Roads and Bridges). During June and July the mine clearing 
school was to be established, with a site identified, equipment supplied, and the 
first group of instructors in place. The first group of students was expected to 
complete an eight-week course in August. Under the U.N. plan, 140 Mozambicans 
were to be trained in 1993, with a total of 570 students certified as mine-clearers 
by 1994. Eventually, 1,500 Mozambicans would be trained as deminers. 
 The U.N. plan is aimed at eventually replacing all foreign mine clearance 
companies with Mozambicans.  Aldo Ajello, the U.N. Special Representative in 
Mozambique, estimates that the demining effort could provide employment for up 
to 2,000 people. These jobs would be earmarked for demobilized soldiers.  The U.N. 
hopes to train demobilized soldiers from both sides in mine clearance 
techniques.  This would not only create employment, but might also promote 
reconciliation, especially if former Renamo and FAM soldiers work together for a 
common goal in a dangerous environment.  However, until demobilization is 
completed--and it has hardly begun--the allocation of soldiers requires approval 
from the Commission on the Establishment of the Mozambique Defence Forces. 
 
 
Mine Clearance Delays 
 
 Regrettably, the U.N. plan failed to get government and Renamo approval 
in its original form.  Throughout nearly all of 1993, there was almost no progress in 
implementing aspects of the U.N. plan.  The U.N. mine clearance efforts were 
paralyzed by delays attributable to both Renamo and the government on matters 
largely unrelated to demining, as the struggle for power by the government and 




Renamo shifted from the battlefield to the bureaucracy.  In particular, there has 
been constant jockeying for power within the two peace commissions: the 
Supervisory and Control Commission (CSC), and the Commission on the 
Establishment of the Mozambique Defence Forces (CCFADM).  Disputes within the 
commissions have had a very negative impact on mine clearance efforts. 
 The UNHCR summarized the difficulties thusly: 
 
  The political situation, the organizational and 
decision-making structure of the political body, the slowdown, 
or better, stagnation of the demobilization process, the lack of 
coordination of all interested parties (Government, Renamo, UN 
and other international organizations, NGOs and commercial 
interested groups) delay the process of solving the mine 





 U.N. plans for demining have to be approved by both sides in the CSC, but 
little of substance was agreed upon between December 1992 and November 1993, 
as U.N. initiatives were blocked or delayed by either the government or Renamo.  At 
the December 31, 1992 meeting, both the government and Renamo agreed in 
principle to the U.N. plan, but objected to some of the wording.  Government 
officials told Human Rights Watch that they disagreed with the text of the original 
plan because it suggested that the government had been as responsible as 
Renamo for laying mines. Subsequently, U.N. demining expert Patrick  
 
 
Blagden and the U.N. Demining Project Manager Andre Millorit  
attempted to redraft the plan in a way acceptable to the government and Renamo. 
 Following U.N. lobbying, both sides agreed that individual mine clearance 
initiatives could go ahead before the overall Mine Clearance Plan was approved 
by the CSC. However, all individual initiatives would still require CSC clearance.  
Despite the delays, the U.N. continued to press forward with its plan.  For example, 
two Dutch mine clearance experts arrived in August 1993 to assist with planning 
and setting up the proposed mine school.  Apparently, the U.N. also engaged, if only 
on a sporadic basis, in some actual clearance activities.  Human Rights Watch 
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was told that an Italian demining team under U.N. auspices cleared some bridge 
areas in Manica province early in 1993. 
 At the CSC meetings from January to March 1993, the government 
blocked proposals to extend mine clearance. Renamo started a three month 
boycott of the CSC in March, making approval of any mine clearance initiatives 
impossible. Renamo eventually returned to Maputo and the CSC resumed 
functioning on June 3rd. But, with other pressing business, such as ceasefire 
violations, mine clearance was not high on the agenda. 
 A Mine Clearance Sub-Committee (MCSC) was finally set up on June 30th. 
 (This was called the Mine Policy and Planning Sub-Committee until the CSC 
rejected the name.)  The first MCSC meeting achieved little except the 
announcement of the extension of GSG's contract. The Renamo official 
participating in this first meeting refused to approve any proposals, saying he 
lacked the mandate to make decisions in the subcommittee.  In July, Renamo 
nominated its delegate for the subcommittee, Mr. Jose Bute.  Lt. Col. Osorio leads 
the government delegation. The U.N.'s Andre Milloret oversees the subcommittee. 
All decisions made in the MCSC must still be put forward to the CSC for approval. 
 Since March, the government has been increasingly cooperative toward 
the U.N. with respect to mine clearance, perhaps recognizing that open roads are 
to its advantage, and also seeing the political advantages if only Renamo could be 
blamed for hampering clearance efforts.  
 In contrast, from mid-1993 to late 1993, Renamo became less 
enthusiastic and was increasingly responsible for serious delays and the 
postponement of decisions in the commissions. Renamo's delegates on the MCSC 
initially had not been briefed by their superiors on earlier mine clearance 
discussions with the U.N., and did not have copies of the correspondence related 
to mine clearance. The U.N. office for mine clearance in Maputo has since been in 
frequent touch with the Renamo delegates in an attempt to ensure that they are as 
well-briefed as the government delegation. 
 
Priority Road Clearance 
 
 The problems with the commissions have forced the U.N. to adhere 
rigidly to clearance of the 25 CSC-approved roads, which combine for 2,022 
kilometers of road.  U.N. officials admit that with the end of the drought and further 
intelligence, the priority of roads has changed.  However, fearing that any change 
will cause further delays, they believe it is better to get a core of projects 
underway before any new agenda is pushed. 




 Eighty percent of the 25 roads CSC-approved roads are in the central 
provinces of Manica and Sofala. (See Chart). 
 
 
PRIORITY ROADS APPROVED FOR DEMINING 
    Section   Km   Type     Status 
SOFALA 
 
Maringue - Canda 
 
       






Lot of destroyed bridges 
+ culverts  
Number One - Magunde         21 Gravel Very poor road 
Magunde - Chibabava         15 Gravel Very poor road 
Dondo - Muanza         82 Gravel Poor road, 2 bridges 
broken, anti tank mines 
Muanza - Inhaminga         65 Gravel Very poor, 3 bridges 
broken, anti tank mines 
Inhaminga - Caia        114 Gravel Very poor, 5 bridges 
broken 
Gorongosa - Inhaminga        112 Gravel Very poor, 4 bridges 
broken, antitank mines 
Gorongosa - Vunduzi         43 Gravel              
  
Poor, antitank mines 
Maqueze - Dindiza        116 Earth  Sandy road, deep scours, 
5 bridges broken  
Marromeu - Chemba        224 Gravel            Not passable, many 
broken bridges 
Chemba - Tambara         96 Gravel          Very poor conditions, 2 
bridges broken  










        35 
 
 
       
  1065 






Macossa - Maringue 
 
         
        59 
 
 
Gravel      
 
 
Big scours + broken 
bridges + antitank mines 
Goonda - Dombe         90 Gravel         At least 5 bridges broken 
Chitobe - Chibabava         70 Gravel         Very poor, impassable  
MANICA/SOFALA 
SUB-TOTAL 





Sussundenga - Dombe 
 
       
 
        90 







Poor condition  
Catandica - Choa         26 Earth          Big scours, mountainous. 
Guro - Mungari         20 Earth          Very poor condition, one 
broken bridge. 




        37 Gravel          Poor condition, heavily 
mined 
Inhacufera - Citobe         87 Gravel          Very poor 




       438 
  



















Big scours, broken 
bridges 
Derre - Liciro        105 Gravel           Big scours, broken 
bridges 







    





GRAND TOTAL: 2022 KILOMETERS 
 
 The U.N. has already identified an additional 2,231 kilometers of road for 
clearance in Zambezia province, but it has not been approved by the CSC. The U.N. 
has indicated that the government has given its approval, but not Renamo.6  
Included are the following roads, several of which are already in use: 
 
Malei - Namanjavira (219 kms); Namanjavira - Liciro (82 kms);  
Derre - Alto Benfica (93 kms); Morrumbala - Pinda (30 kms);  
Pinda - Megaza (30 kms); Megaza - Chire (61 kms);  
Chire - Chilombo (38 kms); Milange - Majaua (65 kms);  
Majaua - Chire (67 kms); Namarroi - Regone (28 kms);  
Regone - Gurue (56 kms); Namarroi - Tacuane (125 kms);  
Tacuane - Liciro (73 kms); Liciro - Chire (108 kms);  
Nauela - Gurue (86 kms); Alto Molocue - Mutala (57 kms);  
Mutala - Gile (94 kms); Alto Molocue - Nauela (51 kms);  
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EN 1 - Campo (38 kms); Campo - Mopeia (79 kms);  
Mopeia - Luabo (70 kms); Lugela - Tacuane (32 kms);  
Mulevala - Mocubela (70 kms); Mulevala - Morrua (51 kms); 
Morrumbala - Guerrissa (53 kms); Guerrissa - Lualua (49 kms); Morrumbala - Zero 
(55 kms); Zero - Mopeia (52 kms);  
Maganja - Pebane (140 kms); Morrua - Marropino (33 kms);  
Marropino - Pebane (100 kms); Malei - Liciro (46 kms) 
 
 According to the U.N., Regional Humanitarian Commissions will propose 
priorities among these roads, and the U.N. Program Manager will then coordinate 
and propose clearance plans to the Mine Clearance Sub-Committee of the CFC for 
approval. 
 Once clearance gets properly underway in Manica, Sofala and Zambezia, 
the U.N. intends to draw up a list of priority roads for clearance in Cabo Delgado 
and Niassa provinces. 
 Human Rights Watch believes that the United Nations plan for mine 
clearance in Mozambique continues to be too focused on demining main roads, at 
the expense of clearance in rural areas.  All available statistics indicate that bush 
paths are the location of the largest number of civilian mine injuries.  Bush paths 
are likely to pose the gravest danger to civilians in the years to come.   
 There may be a number of reasons for the U.N. focus on road clearance:  
the political reality that thus far demining of main roads is the only thing that the 
government and Renamo have been able to agree on;  pressure from 
humanitarian agencies that utilize the roads; and the fact that clearance of bush 
paths is simply not commercially attractive to private firms.  Nevertheless, the 
United Nations, as the overseer of demining nationwide, should do all it can to 
ensure that badly-mined rural areas are a top priority. 
 
NPA Clearance in Tete  
 
 Some progress was achieved in late August 1993 following a visit to 
Mozambique by Patrick Blagden.  Blagden issued an ultimatum to both the 
government and Renamo on August 20th, and threatened to withdraw U.N. support 
for mine clearance if some headway was not made. This appears to have 
produced results. Both sides agreed to a nationwide survey of the mines problem 
by the British NGO Halo Trust, although the contract was not sent to Halo until mid-
December.   
 Additionally, at a meeting on August 24th in Tete between Andre Millorit 




and Renamo and government officials, it was agreed that a second professional 
mine clearance operation (in addition to the GSG pilot project) could proceed, in 
Tete province.  The project is jointly  
 
financed by Norway and ONUHAC, and is being carried out under the supervision of 
a nongovernmental organization, Norwegian People's Aid (NPA).  
 Frustrated with the months of delays, NPA had quietly trained 64 
demobilized government soldiers in mine clearance techniques in July and 
August.  These soldiers were all demobilized prior to the peace agreement, 
thereby not requiring CCFADM clearance.  They initially cleared a minefield near 
the village of Changara, removing and destroying 124 antipersonnel mines in two 
weeks time.
7
  NPA is now employing them in two teams to clear mines from rural 
roads in Mutarara district that are used by refugees returning from Malawi.  On 
January 19, 1994, one of the Mozambican deminers was injured in a mine 
clearance accident and had a below-the-ankle amputation.  He subsequently died 
from a pre-existing condition exacerbated by his mine injury. 
 There was no agreement at the August 24 meeting with regard to mine 
clearance in Renamo areas, because Renamo's local officials claimed they had 




 On November 24, 1993, the CSC finally approved the U.N. clearance plan in 
a revised form.  The U.N. is now proceeding with the establishment of its training 
school, and is expected to award a major clearance contract very soon.  The CSC 
also approved mine clearance operations in Zambezia province by Halo Trust. 
(See below.) 
  
 U.N. Mine Clearance Training Center  
 
 The U.N. Mine Clearance Training Center (MCTC) officially opened on 
January 15, 1994 with Lt. Colonel Arend van der Veen as its head.  It is located just 
outside Beira in a facility provided by the government, but which will have to be 
refurbished by the U.N.  Although no training has yet taken place, demobilized 
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soldiers from both government and Renamo forces will be trained, in four-week-
long courses.  The U.N. will hire foreign trainers until a sufficient number of 
Mozambicans have the experience to take over.  Human Rights Watch has been 
told that, in addition to the two instructors from the Netherlands who have been in 
Mozambique since August, the MCTC will employ 6 trainers from Bangladesh, and 
two each from Australia, New Zealand, and Italy.  ONUMOZ has budgeted $3.2 
million for the MCTC for vehicles, equipment, salaries for instructors and trainees, 
and other expenses during a 14-month period. In the long run, it is expected that as 
many as 1,200 deminers may need to be trained, depending on the degree of mine 




Funding for Mine Clearance 
 
 The United Nations estimated that $30 million would be needed for the 
first year of mine clearance in Mozambique.  To date, the U.N. has earmarked $14 
million for mine clearance in Mozambique--$7 million from the ONUMOZ budget 
and $7 million from the Department of Humanitarian Assistance (DHA) Trust Fund.  
In addition, individual nations are contributing funds.  The U.N.'s Humanitarian 
Assistance Coordination office (UNOHAC) announced on February 19, 1993 that 
Sweden, Holland and Norway will provide financial assistance for demining.  
Sweden will provide $4.3 million and Holland $2.7 million for the DHA Trust Fund 
for mine clearance.  Norway will provide $1.1 million for mine clearance in Tete 
province.  Italy has also announced it will provide funds for mine clearance. 
 UNOHAC is expected in the very near future to award a major contract to a 
private company for mine clearance of roads in Mozambique. The final selection 
will be made by the United Nations Development Program Operations Department 
in New York.  Human Rights Watch has been told that only three companies are 
now under consideration:   Royal Ordnance of the U.K.; Mecam of South Africa; and 
Lonrho de Mocambique (Lomaco).  Other companies that had been on a U.N. short-
list--Defence Systems Ltd (DSL)
9
 of the U.K., Compagnie Francaise d'Assistance 
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 DSL was involved in adhoc clearing of mines along access roads to the Nacala railway 
line from 1988 through December 1993, with funding provided by the European Community.  
DSL now has a funding proposal before the French government for mine clearance along 




Specialisee (COFRAS) of France, Societe D'Exportation de Ministere D'Interieur 
(Sofermi) of France, and SDS International of the U.S.--have either been eliminated 
from or dropped out of the competition. 
 
 U.S. AID 
 
 At the end of September 1993, the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) awarded a $3.9 million contract to the Washington, D.C.-
based Ronco Consulting Corporation for clearance of 2,170 kilometers of priority-
designated roads in Manica, Sofala, and Zambezia provinces.  Some of the roads 
will be chosen to complement USAID's Rural Access Road Project.  Ronco has 
begun training demining teams, with both government and Renamo personnel.  
Ronco intends to train 140 deminers.  Initial deployment of the teams is not 
expected for several months. 
 Human Rights Watch obtained a copy of USAID's specifications for the 
companies bidding on its contract.  They are as follows: 
 
  
  The contractor will be responsible for clearing the 
road over its entire width, and to a distance of at least 3 meters 
from the edge of the road surface unless this is impractical. If 
the route way has no defined road surface, the clearance will be 
four meters either side of the track centerline. Where the road 
edge is less than two meters from the centerline of the road the 
contractor will be required to clear a total width of eight meters. 




  Where bridges have been mined or destroyed the 
contractor will be responsible for clearing all mines and 
munitions from the bridges, abutments and piers to a distance 
of 3 meters from the structures concerned. The bridge repair 
agency will also determine if further areas require clearance. 
Eight square meters of area cleared will be considered 
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equivalent of one meter of road clearance.   
 
  The contractor is to undertake to remove all mines and 
munitions from the area cleared. He will be responsible for 
removing at least 99.6% of all mines and munitions present. All 
mines and munitions are required to be destroyed in situ 
unless this action will cause damage to other structures. If this 
is the case, the munition or mine has to be disarmed and 
destroyed in a safe location. All mines and munitions are to be 
destroyed on the working day of discovery. 
 
  The contractor is obliged to keep records of all mines 
and munitions cleared, preferably stating their location and 
type. The contractor is expected to maintain a rate of progress 
sufficient to clear 2170 kilometers of road or tracks within 214 
days of the award of the contract. The contractor may be 
expected to operate in one, two or three locations, each being 
up to 600 kilometers from the next. 
 
  The clearance work carried out will be subjected to 
Quality Assurance checking. If the sample testing indicates that 
mine or munition clearance rates have fallen below 99.6%, a 
proportion of payment will be withheld until the particular 
section has been cleared and rechecked. 
 
 At least fifteen companies and organizations bid for the the USAID mine 
clearance contract in Mozambique, in what was apparently a very aggressive 
competition. The USAID selection panel originally made its decision in August, but 
another company appealed the decision delaying the contract award until 
September. This competition is evidence that a significant number of companies 
involved in the mine, ordnance and demolition industries are viewing 
humanitarian mine clearance as a new and potentially lucrative business 
opportunity.    
 In addition to Ronco, other companies bidding included:  
 
* CMS, Tampa, FL  
* Environmental Chemical Corporation, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Division, 
San Diego, CA 




* EOD Technology Inc., Oak Ridge, TN  
* Explosive Ordnance Disposal, World Services Incorporated, Fort Walton, FL 
* First Texas Manufacturing Co., El Paso, TX 
* Human Factors Applications, Inc., Explosive Ordnance Disposal Division, San 
Diego, CA 
* The Rimfire Foundation, Inc, New York, NY and London, UK 
* SDS International, Arlington, VA 
* UXB International, Inc., Chantilly, VA 
* IADB, Washington, DC 
* IDAS, San Salvador, El Salvador 
* US Defense Systems, Washington, DC 
* Brown and Root, Houston, TX 
* Sparta, Inc., Laguna Hills, CA 
 
 U.S. Department of Defense  
 
 From March 21-30, U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) sent a mission to 
Mozambique to assess whether U.S. Army engineering teams could contribute to 
the rebuilding of roads and infrastructure.  Mine clearance was part of their 
assessment. The assessment team was made up of officials from the U.S. Army 
Belvoir Research, Development and Engineering Center, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia; the 
U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Charlottesville, Virginia; and the 
U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School of Combat Developments, Fort Bragg, 
North Carolina.  
 The team's conclusion was that direct U.S. Army involvement would be 
too costly for the U.S. taxpayer and that funds channeled through private sector 
contract bids would be more cost effective. It is Human Rights Watch's 
understanding that the Belvoir RD&E Center's Countermines Systems Directorate 
has put together a catalogue, with color pictures, of the mine types recognized 
during this Mozambique mission, and that the intention is to publish this report in 
an unclassified form so that it is accessible to Freedom of Information Act 
requests. However, apparently a dispute between the Foreign Science and 
Technology Center and the Defense Intelligence Agency over who will pay for 




 A German nongovernmental organization which will be involved in 




construction activities in Mozambique hired the private Zimbabwean mine 
clearance company, Mine-Tech, to do mine assessment surveys in Manica and 
Sofala provinces.  In December 1993, Mine-Tech conducted the surveys in the 
Gorongosa region of Sofala and along an 8 kilometer stretch of the Espungabera-
Gogoi road in Manica.  Mine-Tech has told Human Rights Watch that its survey in 
the Gorongosa region indicated that it is not as badly affected as earlier reports 
suggested, although some areas are heavily mined.   
 On the other hand, Mine-Tech was surprised at how badly mined the 
border area is in Manica province, and believes that mines will be a serious threat 
to repatriation in that area.  Mine-Tech hopes to obtain funding from the Italian 
NGO Centro Informazione E Educazione Allo Sviluppo (CIES) to clear roads in the 
Espungabera region of Manica.  These roads have been designated as routeways 
for returnees from the Zimbabwean refugee camps. 
 Mine-Tech is a division of Strongman Engineering Ltd, located in Harare.  
It is run by Col. Lionel Von Dyck, a former Rhodesian army officer who worked with 
Renamo. After independence, Von Dyck stayed on in the Zimbabwe army and 
commanded an elite paratroop unit which operated in Mozambique against 
Renamo.  Mine-Tech boasts of its unparalled Mozambican experience, with some 
of its employees also having first trained Renamo in mine laying techniques and 




 South African companies are also bidding for clearance contracts, most 
notably Mecam, which is under consideration for the major U.N. contract.  Mecam 
is headed by Vernon Joynt, who previously designed mines for the South African 
Defense Force, including, in all likelihood, some of those now found in 
Mozambique. 
 A U.N. memo on mine clearance reveals that three British-based 
companies considered for initial road clearance contracts were favored because 
of their good ties to South Africa and South African mine clearance expertise. 
 
Independent Mine Clearance by the Government and Renamo 
 
 Although both Renamo and the government have been responsible for 
delaying mine clearance initiatives in the commissions, independent, 
uncoordinated mine clearance by both sides is underway across the country.  The 
government and Renamo sometimes do not even bother to inform the United 




Nations about their demining activities.
10
 
  The government has been clearing roads through its areas since 
November. The government's mines expert for Manica/Sofala provinces, Captain 
Boaventure Chupica Gavalho, told Human Rights Watch that the government has 
made Manica/Sofala a priority area for its own clearance.  Government clearance 
has taken place, or will take place, on the following seven roads: 
 
Inchope - Save 
Machurure - Chibabava 
Naboa - Machaze 
Vunduzi - Casa Banana 
Chemba - Sena 
Marromeu - Inhamitanga 
Buzi - Tica 
 
 According to Captain Gavalho, once these roads have been cleared, 
operations will move to Maputo province, seen by the government as the second-
worst affected zone.  Government soldiers have also been active in mine 
clearance in many other areas. The private firm Edlow & Gemcor has supervised 
soldiers clearing mines at Micuine, 50 kilometers south of Quelimane. Parts of the 
Nampula-to-Angoche road have also been cleared by government soldiers.  After 
government deminers cleared 20 kilometers of road west of Milange (Zambezia), 
Renamo confiscated their mine clearance bulldozer in Milange, saying that the 
soldiers did not have permission to enter Renamo areas. 
 The government has also been pressing for certain strategically 
important roads to be cleared in the GSG pilot project. For example, significant 
pressure was put on GSG to clear the road between Vunduzi and Casa Banana. 
Casa Banana, which has a military garrison, was the location of Renamo's 
headquarters from 1983 until it was captured by the government in 1985.  The road 
has been cleared up to the point where a major bridge is down, delaying further 
operations. 
 The government's National Ministry for Roads and Bridges (DNEP) is also 
active in mine clearance. Under pressure from commercial entrepreneurs to re-
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open lucrative trade routes quickly, the DNEP has been using soldiers demobilized 
before the peace accord on short contracts. 
 Although Renamo is also actively clearing mines along certain roads in 
its areas, it is reluctant to see some roads opened through its areas for fear that 
the government could then move armored units through the areas Renamo 
controls. Particularly sensitive is the Macossa-Maringue-Canxixe stretch of road; 
Maringue is Renamo's current headquarters. 
 The quality of much of the clearance by Renamo and the government is 
not good.  Many of the roads supposedly cleared are regarded as unsafe by 
international humanitarian agencies and the U.N.  Still, many local Mozambicans 
are taking the risk of using them. One trucker interviewed in central Mozambique 
by Human Rights Watch described his incentive: 
 
  There is much money to be made just now. Timber 
especially. I can't wait for ONUMOZ. I'm happy to risk my vehicle 
if the road has been cleared by Renamo or the government. Also 
if other vehicles use the route frequently, I'll follow their tracks. 
I will not be the first down those roads after the rains. I'll let 
some one else risk that! 
 
  The international agencies have found evidence that Renamo's 
clearance is particularly poor. Renamo denies this, claiming that the government 
has continued to lay mines in an attempt to denigrate Renamo's reputation.   
 An official from Mine-Tech told Human Rights Watch of an appalling 
example of dangerous and incompetent clearance by the government.  In 
December 1993, along the Espungabera-Gogoi road in Manica province, he 
observed a government team of five clearers at work.  Fifty yards ahead of the 
team, fifty refugee peasants, who were being paid by the government, were 
walking along the road and clearing it of grass, despite the near certain 
knowledge of the existence of mines. Moreover, the Mine-Tech official observed 
that there were many gaps in the clearance of the team, who were using prodders 
incorrectly, and that there were no safety procedures, no radios, no medical 
officer; all the explosives and fuzes were being kept in the same box.  Apparently 
the team was being paid by the number of kilometers cleared, which is an 
incentive to work as quickly as possible without adequate concern for safety or 
quality. 
   
NGO Mine Clearance Initiatives 





 Aside from the Norwegian People's Aid mine clearance operation in Tete, 
other nongovernmental organizations are involved in mine clearance activities in 
Mozambique, notably Halo Trust and the Mines Advisory Group (MAG). 
 
 Halo Trust 
 
 Halo Trust, a London-based humanitarian non-profit mine clearance 
organization, has been granted a U.N. contract to conduct a nationwide 
assessment of the landmines problem.  As noted above, Renamo and the 
government agreed to this project in late August, after months of paralysis, but the 
contract was not signed until December 15.  Vehicles and other equipment were 
shipped in January and Halo began work in early February 1994.  Six teams will be 
sent with questionnaires to every district and municipality in an attempt to draw 




will be put into a data base and plotted onto a 1:250,000 map. These maps will then 
be available to NGOs and other organizations who require landmines information 
for their work.  
 Halo Trust estimates that the work will take four months, based on a 
similar survey they conducted for the UNHCR in Cambodia in 1991. However, 
Human Rights Watch found during its partial survey of Mozambique that obtaining 
specific details about landmine locations is a lengthy process.  One informant told 
us that a mine was located "two cigarettes away."  It turned out that he wanted  
cigarettes for giving us the information and that the distance to the mine was the 
time he took to smoke a cigarette. As his mood determined how long he smoked 
his cigarette, we found it difficult to obtain a firm location from him, although 
other villagers confirmed he knew where the mine was because he planted it. The 
whole conversation lasted nearly thirty-five minutes. 
 In addition to the survey, Halo Trust received approval from the CSC in 
November to engage in mine clearance in Zambezia.  Halo plans to train three 
demining teams.  Training for the first team was completed in January 1994, 
training for the second team began in early February.  The first team began 
operations in Cariua, clearing around abandoned buildings; four mines were 
found.  Halo is carrying out the work under a contract with three NGOs--Oxfam (UK), 
Save the Children Fund (UK), and Action Aid--which have received a grant of some 




,700,000 from the British Overseas Development Administration.   
 
 Mines Advisory Group (MAG) 
 
 MAG, a British-based mine clearance NGO, sent an assessment mission 
to Mozambique in March-April 1993, which visited Maputo, Tete, and Inhambane 
provinces.
11
 MAG is seeking funding from the European Community to conduct a six 
month pilot project in Inhambane province. MAG also plans to send six expatriates 
to Mozambique who would spend three months selecting and training 40 local 
staff to conduct mine surveys and clearance.  In addition, MAG hopes to link up 
with Handicap International in a mines awareness project. 
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 The use of landmines by all parties in Mozambique, as documented in 
earlier chapters in this report, violates both customary and treaty laws of war.  
This chapter outlines the general structure of international law governing 
landmines, including disarmament law, customary law of war, and the 1980 
Landmines Protocol. 
 
International Disarmament Law  
 
 No international law currently governs the production, stockpiling, or 
transfer of landmines.  Thus, landmines do not fall within the scope of 
international treaty law of disarmament. Nor is there even a requirement that 
landmines be reported as a category under the recently operational United 
Nations Conventional Arms Register. 
 Human Rights Watch regards the failure of international disarmament 
law to include landmines in both substantive arms control regimes and reporting 
regimes as unfortunate, given the vast abuses wrought by these weapons.  Human 
Rights Watch endorses the U.S.-sponsored resolution passed by the U.N. General 
Assembly on November 17, 1993, which calls upon all states "to agree to a 
moratorium on the export of antipersonnel landmines that pose grave dangers to 
civilian populations," "urges States to implement such a moratorium," and 
requests the Secretary-General to prepare a report on this initiative, "including 
possible recommendations regarding further appropriate measures to limit the 
export of antipersonnel landmines."
2
   
 Human Rights Watch also endorses national export moratoria voluntarily 
undertaken by several countries, including the United States, France, and Belgium. 
 At the same time, Human Rights Watch believes that export moratoria, even 
widely adopted, are insufficient to deal with the magnitude of the landmines 
crisis.  Export moratoria alone, unaccompanied by bans on production and 
stockpiling, rest inevitably on the assumption that "our" armed forces are capable 
of "responsibly" using landmines even if "theirs'" are not.   
                                                                    
 
    
1
 "Landmines" or "mines," as used in this chapter refers to antipersonnel, and not antitank, 
landmines, unless otherwise specified. 
    
2
 United Nations General Assembly, 48th Session, Document A/C.1/48/l.42. 
 In reality, the experience of the past twenty years has shown decisively, 
in too many diverse places throughout the world, that there is no "responsible" 




use of landmines.  The weapon has been proven in practice to be indiscriminate.  
This is as true of its use by technologically sophisticated militaries such as those 
of the United States and the former Soviet Union slewing millions of remotely-
delivered mines from aircraft in Vietnam and Afghanistan, as it is of 
technologically primitive guerrilla armies handlaying millions of cheap mines 
mass-produced in factories in both the developed and developing world. 
 The problem with landmines, however, is not only one of indiscriminate 
placement.  The fundamental difficulty is that because of their delayed-action 
function, landmines are inherently indiscriminate weapons.  They usually outlast 
the military purpose for which they were placed, thereby creating grave, long-
term danger for civilians. 
 Disarmament law, national as well as international, therefore should 
take into account the need to ban not only export of landmines, but also their 
production, stockpiling, and use.  These measures were taken with respect to 
biological and toxin weapons in the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.  The 
indiscriminate effects of landmine use, the grotesque injuries mines cause, and 
their terrible potential for long-term and widespread devastation, urge that 
landmines similarly be banned. 
 
International Humanitarian Law 
 
 Although production, stockpiling, and export of landmines are not 
currently regulated by international law, use of landmines is.  The use of 
landmines in armed conflict is governed by international humanitarian law, or, the 
laws of war.  Two bodies of international humanitarian law regulate the use of 
landmines in armed conflict:  first, customary international law and, second, 
international treaty law found in Protocol II to the 1980 Weapons Convention, 
known as the Landmines Protocol.
3
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 Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps and Other 
Devices (Landmines Protocol); U.N.G.A. Doc. A/Conf. 95/15 and Corr. 1-5; 19 Int'l Legal 
Materials 1534 (1980).  In addition to the Landmines Protocol (Protocol II), two other 
agreements concerning Non-detectable Fragments (Protocol I) and Prohibitions or 
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Weapons Convention and the Protocols entered into force on December 2, 1983.  Thirty-six 
countries are parties to the Landmines Protocol as of this writing; the United States is not 
among them, having signed but not ratified the treaty. 




 International Customary Law   
 
 International customary law derives its status as law not by being 
written down in a formal international agreement or treaty, but by reason of 
having been followed for a long period of time by a large number of states, and 
regarded as binding law by them.  It is referred to as "customary" law on account 
of its unwritten nature.   
 Customary law is often codified in treaties, although it is not the treaty 
that gives it the status of law in the first place.  One such treaty that, in part, 
codifies matters of customary international law relevant to the regulation of 
landmines use is 1977 Additional Protocol I (Protocol I).
4
  Its provisions codify, at 
Article 51, customary law prohibiting, first, direct attacks on noncombatants.  
Second, its provisions also codify, a prohibition, as stated in Article 51, on 
indiscriminate attacks.  Although Article 51 of Protocol I refers by the treaty's 
terms to international armed conflict, it is the view of Human Rights Watch that 
customary law prohibiting direct attacks on noncombatants and indiscriminate 





 Direct Attacks on Noncombatants  
 
 Preceding chapters of this report have described circumstances in 
which landmines have been used to attack civilians directly -- circumstances in 
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 The Additional Protocols of June 8, 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 
(Additional Protocol I Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 
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Materials 1391 (1977). 
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and Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Advisor, United States Dept. of State, "The United 
States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols 
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which the purpose for using landmines was to harm or threaten harm to civilians.  
These purposes have included the sowing of landmines to empty certain regions 
of populations, create refugee flows, and interfere with civilian food supplies.  
Such actions aim directly to harm civilians, and as such are illegal under the laws 
of war because they are direct attacks within the meaning of Article 51 of Protocol 
I, codifying customary law.   
 
 Indiscriminate Attacks 
 
 Even where the purpose of using landmines is not for attacking 
noncombatants directly, Human Rights Watch views any use of landmines as an 
indiscriminate attack within the meaning of customary law, as codified by Article 
51 of Protocol I.  This conclusion arises from the delayed action nature of the 
weapon.  Article 51 codifies a customary prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, 
specifically those which "are of a nature to strike military objects and civilians or 
civilian objects without distinction," those which "employ a method or means of 
combat, the effects of which cannot be limited...," and those "which employ a 
method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military 
objective." 
  Each of these describes what, in fact, happens when landmines are used. 
 Because of their delayed action design, unless triggered, mines continue to 
remain armed long after the battle, even long after the conflict, and ready to 
explode no matter who steps on it, soldier or civilian.  Thus, by their nature, mines 
cannot distinguish military objects and civilians, their temporal effects cannot be 
controlled, and a mine explosion cannot be directed at a specific military 
objective.  Accordingly, international prohibitions on indiscriminate attacks, if 
properly applied, should bar all landmine use. 
 Human Rights Watch's view of customary law in the matter of 
indiscriminate attack is strengthened by considering the official Commentary by 
the International Committee of the Red Cross on Article 51 of Protocol I.  It agrees 
that "the use of mines constitute[s] an attack" not merely at the moment a mine is 
laid, nor merely when it is armed, but instead "when a person [is] directly 
endangered by such a mine."
6
  Since an "attack" by a mine stretches until the 
moment when a person is endangered by it, the determination of whether the 
weapon is a means or method of warfare capable of fulfilling the so-called 
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 ICRC, Commentary on the 1977 Additional Protocols, p. 622. 




"principle of distinction" must include not only the presumably military target 
intended in the initial placement on the battlefield, but all future noncombatants 
who might step on the mine.  Understood as the ICRC Commentary understands 
"attack," it is evident that the delayed action nature of mines causes them to be an 
indiscriminate, and hence prohibited, weapon. 
 The ICRC has also recommended that: 
 
 belligerents should refrain from using weapons...which on 
account of their imprecision or their effects harm civilian 
populations and combatants without distinction...[and] whose 
consequences escape from the control of those employing 




Implementing this recommendation requires a ban on using landmines because 
of their indiscriminate effects:  they harm civilian populations and combatants 
without distinction, and escape from the control of those employing them. 
 
 Military Utility Versus Humanitarian Costs 
 
 In addition to the two customary rules prohibiting certain direct and 
indiscriminate attacks, customary law also requires that the military value 
deriving from the use of a weapon outweigh its humanitarian costs.  This 
customary law rule applies as a balancing test in two distinct circumstances.  
First, any particular use of mines on the battlefield requires that the commander 
contemplating their use weigh up the immediate and concrete military advantage 
to be gained from a mine attack against its collateral costs to civilians.  This is a 
calculation made with respect to the benefits and costs of using mines in a 
particular instance.   
 Second, humanitarian law, in evaluating mines as an overall weapons 
system, must consider whether the aggregate military benefits conferred by 
mines outweigh the aggregate humanitarian costs of mines.  This is a calculation 
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undertaken with respect to the weapon as a whole, and it is essential to whether 
international law ought to permit the use of the weapon.  Whole categories of 
weapons, such as explosive bullets and chemical weapons, have been banned in 
earlier times based on this form of calculation, and the same determination ought 
to be applied to mines as a weapon system. 
 Human Rights Watch believes that landmine use can never satisfy this 
proportionality test.  With respect to the first calculation, the required localized 
evaluation by a field commander of military utility versus collateral costs 
demonstrates the unique nature, and risks, posed by mines as a weapons system 
that operates practically in perpetuity.  Where a commander is required to 
calculate the military utility versus costs of using a non-delayed action weapon 
system -- even one of great destructiveness -- that calculation, while typically a 
rough guess based on imperfect information, at least considers the effects the 
system will have at the moment it is used.  The time delay inherent in landmine 
use, however, means that the possible effects are hidden from the commander 
making the calculation required by the laws of war.  He is required to take into 
account not only the uncertainties of today, but to look forward into the future and 
estimate costs over the lifetime of the mine, often decades.  The battlefield 
commander cannot know whether the immediate and concrete military 
advantages of mines in a given situation are outweighed or not by the future 
humanitarian costs of a delayed action weapon.  The fact that the calculation 
cannot meaningfully be made is reason to doubt, under the proportionality 
principle, the legality of the weapon. 
 With respect to the second calculation, the military utility versus 
humanitarian costs of mines as a whole weapon system, Human Rights Watch 
believes that the humanitarian costs have been concretely demonstrated to be so 
enormous that they simply outweigh the utility of mines on the battlefield.  The 
humanitarian costs of mines are so high that, in the view of Human Rights Watch, 
mines would have to perform not just a useful military function, but a truly 
indispensible one.  It would have to be a military function which was absolutely 
essential and which could not be covered by any other weapon system.  After 
lengthy discussions with military experts of many countries, and understanding 
fully the value that conventional and irregular armies attach to mines, Human 
Rights Watch does not believe that this threshhold of indispensability is met. 
 Thus, in the view of Human Rights Watch, under the proportionality 
principle, as well as under the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, any use of 
mines is forbidden. 
 




The Landmines Protocol 
 
 The purpose of the 1980 Landmines Protocol was to adapt customary 
humanitarian principles, particularly those expressed in 1977 Additional Protocol 
I, to the peculiar vagaries of antipersonnel and antitank mine warfare.  It has 
failed to achieve this goal, either in theory or in fact.  To conform with customary 
laws prohibiting indiscriminate attacks and requiring prior to attack, the 
balancing of the attack's military utility against its humanitarian costs, the 
Landmines Protocol would have to ban all uses of antipersonnel landmines. 
 Instead, it puts in place a thicket of limitations on how they may be used.  
Chief among these are provisions whose stated purpose is to prohibit both 
deliberate attacks on civilians and indiscriminate use.  Under the Landmines 
Protocol, combatants must refrain from directing mines against civilians; attempt 
certain precautions to minimize collateral harm to civilians resulting from mine 
attacks aimed at military targets; and undertake the use of mines only in 
situations where the anticipated military advantage outweighs the expected harm 
to civilians.  In addition, the Landmines Protocol places specific restrictions on 
the use of remotely delivered mines and booby-traps; mandates that the location 
of mines be recorded and disclosed in certain circumstances; and urges that 
these records be used to assist demining efforts after the close of hostilities as 
well as to warn civilians about the location of minefields.   
 Despite these provisions, the Landmines Protocol is acknowledged to be 
a seriously flawed document by virtually all international organizations, states, 
and outside commentators that have examined it.  The fundamental problem is 
that the drafters of the Protocol ignored the defining feature of landmine use:  that 
landmines are delayed-action weapons.  Because of this delayed-action quality, 
landmines frequently survive their military purpose and remain active for many 
years, placing civilians at great risk.  The time lapse between the point at which a 
mine is planted and the point at which it explodes, virtually ensures 
indiscriminate effects.  Thus, rules that simply regulate the placement of mines 
fail to deal with the heart of the problem:  that landmines produce indiscriminate 
effects regardless of how they are placed. 
 As weapons which produce indiscriminate effects, landmines are illegal 
under customary humanitarian law.  The Landmines Protocol, thus, not only does 
not deal practically with the central problem of mine warfare; it is itself in 
violation of customary laws prohibiting indiscriminate means of combat. 
 Similarly, the Landmines Protocol ignores the problem of applying the 
proportionality principle to the use of landmines; as noted above, because of the 




delayed-action function of landmines, it is impossible for a field commander to 
apply the proportionality test in any meaningful way.  In addition, the evidence of 
the last two decades shows overwhelmingly that, on aggregate, the tremendous 
cost to civilians of landmines use far outstrips their relatively limited military 
utility.  Thus, the Landmines Protocol's rule requiring combatants to weigh military 
utility against collateral harm to civilians, actually fails to provide any real 
protection.  It provides an apparent, rather than real, protection.  In addition, by 
permitting the use of landmines, the Landmines Protocol does not comply with 
customary law requiring a realistic assessment of whether the employment of a 
particular weapon system satisfies the proportionality test. 
 The Landmines Protocol contains other serious problems.  Its complex 
rules, discretionary language, and broad exceptions and qualifications to its 
general prohibitions also limit significantly its utility.  Moreover, because its 
provisions apply only to international wars, it is effectively irrelevant to the 
internal armed conflicts in which landmines are chiefly used. 
 In addition to these theoretical flaws, the Landmines Protocol fails on a 
practical level: even its modest restrictions have not been followed in conflicts 
waged since its entry into force almost ten years ago.  Some combatants regularly 
use landmines directly against civilians.  Others utilize mines without taking even 
minimal precautions to safeguard civilians.  No armed force in the last decade is 
known to have consistently and accurately recorded the location of minefields in 
actual combat conditions.  As previous chapters document, all of these failures 
are amply evident in Mozambique. 
 The Landmines Protocol will be the subject of a United Nations review 
conference in 1995; expert meetings are being held in 1994 to develop views on 
reform of the Landmines Protocol.  Human Rights Watch maintains that the 
Landmines Protocol requires more than just reform to bring it into conformity with 
controlling customary international law, particularly as expressed in Additional 
Protocol I.  The only satisfactory measure is to prohibit the use of antipersonnel 
landmines altogether.  Anything else falls short of the requirements of customary 
law prohibiting direct and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, and attacks in 
which it cannot be shown that the expected military value outstrips the 
anticipated humanitarian toll.  Pending this change in the Landmine Protocol, 
Human Rights Watch believes that the relevant legal standard that ought to be 
applied to the use of landmines is that of customary law:  that any such use 










 Mozambique has a serious landmines problem.  Certain parts of the 
country, such as Sofala, Maputo, Manica, and Inhambane provinces, are very badly 
affected. Some areas in other provinces are also heavily mined.  Most combatant 
forces, including those of the Mozambican government, Renamo, Rhodesia, South 
Africa, Tanzania, and Portugal, have been responsible for laying landmines, 
especially antipersonnel mines.  At least fifteen countries, most notably the 
former Soviet Union, have manufactured more than 50 different types of mines 
used in the Mozambican conflict. 
 Most of the mines were laid without markings or warnings to the civilian 
population. A large proportion were laid in such a way that their victims could not 
be other than civilians. More than 8,000 civilians are amputees as a result of 
landmines.  Thousands more have been killed or have not received treatment. The 
impact of landmines is likely to increase in the short term, with the return of 
refugees and displaced people to homes, fields and paths which were mined in 
their absence. 
 Mozambique's capabilities and facilities for the evacuation, emergency 
treatment, hospital treatment and rehabilitation of landmine victims are 
inadequate and not improving. The social needs of landmine victims are not 
attended to properly.  Prostheses operations will be required for thousands of 
victims for many decades to come. 
 Since the October 1992 ceasefire, little professional mine clearance has 
taken place. Although the United Nations is responsible for coordinating 
initiatives, its plans have been postponed and delayed by government and 
Renamo political fighting, as well as the U.N.'s own bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the 
government and Renamo themselves clear roads they want opened, often without 
consultation with the U.N.  The U.N. has focused too much on road clearance, in part 
because of pressure from humanitarian agencies.  Extensively-mined bush paths 
are consistently causing the greatest human suffering.  Unfortunately, the 
clearance of bush paths is not commercially attractive. 
 The use of landmines is subject to international law, primarily customary 
international law and the 1980 Landmines Protocol.  International law prohibits 
the indiscriminate use of weapons and the direct use of landmines against the 
civilian population.  The law requires that mines marked and recorded.  It is clear 
from this report that, in practice, all parties to the conflict in Mozambique have 






routinely abused these provisions. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that one of 
the purposes of the random dissemination of mines in inhabited areas was 
precisely to cause excessive civilian casualties and thereby terrorize the 
population.  The experience of Mozambique suggests that the Landmines Protocol 




I.  General 
 
 The experience of Mozambique has shown that antipersonnel landmines 
present a serious and long-term threat to civilians, far in excess of any short-term 
military advantage which may have been gained in combat. Accordingly, Human 
Rights Watch believes that there should be an international ban on the 




II.  To the Mozambican Government/FAM 
 
(1) The Mozambican government should take immediate steps to assist the 
U.N. in setting up a systematic and coordinated mine clearance program which 
will eradicate mines from all areas used by civilians. 
 
 Essential components of this assistance should be: 
 
   $ Providing deminers access to all necessary maps and 
information on mine imports and types of mines used. 
 
  $ Permitting soldiers with local knowledge of minefield and 
mine locations to participate in mine clearance operations. 
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  $ Marking clearly the location of minefields and ensuring that 
civilians are aware of why these areas are being fenced off. 
 
  $ Ensuring that landmines are destroyed and not returned to 
stores. 
 
(2) The Mozambican government should sign and ratify the 1980 Landmines 
Protocol and abide by its provisions in any future internal or international conflict, 
and should support international efforts to limit the production, trade, and use of 
landmines. 
 
III.  To Renamo 
 
(1) Renamo should cooperate fully with the United Nations mine clearance 
efforts and should provide expert personnel to assist demining operations. 
 
(2) Renamo should provide all available information to the U.N. Demining 
Projects Office or any CSC-approved mine clearance operation or survey. This 
information should include details of the types of mines they used in Mozambique, 
the strategies of dissemination (including methods for preventing mine 
clearance), and the location of the mines (including, wherever possible, minefield 
maps). 
 
(3) Renamo must immediately allow landmine victims freedom of movement in 
order to seek adequate treatment in line with Protocol 3, Article 3a of the October, 
4, 1992 General Peace Accord.    
 
IV.  To the United Nations 
 
(1) The United Nations should ensure that those responsible for causing delays 
or blocking mine clearance initiatives are made publicly accountable. 
 
(2) The U.N. should ensure that mine clearance is not just focused on roads.  
Bush paths and other badly-mined rural areas should be a top priority. 
 
 
(3)  The U.N. should create a voluntary Trust Fund for mine victims.  Local and 




international nongovernmental organizations could apply to the Trust Fund for 
grants for programs to assist mine victims.  Landmine producers and exporters, 
and mine clearance companies profiting from demining, should contribute to the 
fund.  
 
V.  To Mine Producers and Exporters 
 
(1) All countries which have manufactured, designed, or provided landmines 
used in Mozambique should contribute to the cost of the national mine clearance 
program. 
